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From the Editor...
As I write this, you are deciding how to cast your vote in the November elections. I'm sure 
your choices will be the right ones and that the newly elected will, in all cases, work for a 
strong economy and an environment free from the effects of terrorism. My students 
(majoring in logistics and intermodal transportation) are often concerned, given events of 
the past year, about their prospects for jobs as they graduate. The very good news for 
them to this point is that demand for our graduates has shown no signs of softening. Our 
industry has shown remarkable resilience under adverse conditions.
Reaction to the decision to skip a publication year in order to "catch up" with the issue date 
has been extremely positive. I have not received a single complaint, and the number of 
manuscripts submitted has increased significantly. As the number and quality of 
manuscripts increase, maintaining the publication schedule becomes easier.
You will be pleased, I think, with the content of this issue. The lead article, by Jim Keebler, 
begins with an excellent summary of the development of the U.S. transportation industry 
by mode. This sets the stage for his analysis of important trends affecting the 
transportation of goods in the United States. The second article, by Charles Pettijohn, 
Stephen Parker, and John Kent, provides an in-depth look at the relationship between 
transportation salespeople and their customers. In their research, the authors identify a 
number of salesperson traits that are attractive to buyers of transportation services. Both 
sides can benefit from the results! Jim Johnson, Diane McClure, Kenneth Schneider, and 
Donald Wood query owners and managers of short-line railroads about their relationships 
with their Class-I counterparts in the third article of this issue. While the relationships 
between the two are not always "harmonious," the markets they serve assure a long-term 
need to work well together. They also identify what the short-line industry considers to 
be some of the more important trends affecting the Class-I railroads. Dawna Rhoades 
traces the development of the global air transportation industry in the beginning of the 
fourth article. She also describes the nature of the world air transport market both before 
September 11, 2001, and after. She concludes by offering several possible scenarios for 
the future of the industry. In the final article of this issue, Hokey Min reexamines the issue 
of driver turnover and its impact upon profitability of the U.S. trucking industry. His 
research both supports previously published research in this important area and offers new 
managerial insights as well. There you have it. Something for everyone. I hope you take 
the time to read each of the articles in this issue.
Please remember that we cannot survive and continue to publish without reader support. 
Join or renew your membership in Delta Nu Alpha International Transportation Fraternity 
today and subscribe to the Journal of Transportation Management Remember, if you join 
DNA at the Gold level, a subscription to the JTM\s included in your membership! Share 
this issue with a colleague and encourage him/her to subscribe today!
Jerry W. Wilson, Editor
Journal of Transportation Management
Georgia Southern University
Southern Center for Logistics and Intermodal Transportation 
P.O. Box 8152
Statesboro, GA 30460-8152
(912) 681-0257 (912) 681-0710 FAX
jwwilson@gasou.edu
Stephen M. Rutner, Senior Associate Editor 
(501) 575-7334 
srutner@walton.uark.edu
Karl Manrodt, Associate Editor 
(912) 681-0588 
kmanrodt@gasou.edu
Soonhong Min, Associate Editor 
(912) 871-1838 
smin@gasou.edu
And visit our web sites:
Delta Nu Alpha Transportation Fraternity: www.deltanualpha.org 
Georgia Southern University Logistics: www2.gasou.edu/coba/centers/lit
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JTM is to serve as a channel for the 
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management of transportation and logistics 
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interest to both academicians and practitioners 
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transportation and logistics activities.
Submissions from industry practitioners and from 
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considering the submission of an article to the 
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The opinions expressed in published articles are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily 
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TRENDS IN THE TRANSPORTATION 
OF GOODS IN THE U.S.
James S. Keebler 
St. Cloud State University
ABSTRACT
This article describes the development and growth of various modes of transportation in the 
United States and recent trends in the length, size and value of domestic shipments. Changes 
in the transportation of goods in the United States are being driven largely by four 
factors—the shift toward a digital economy, the growth of third-party logistics providers, 
globalism, and the application of new technologies. Finally, this paper looks at emerging 
forms of supply chain integration and operation.
INTRODUCTION
Many factors affect the performance of the 
transportation system: accessibility, safety, 
environmental restraints, input costs, energy 
efficiency, capacity-to-demand ratios, reliability, 
travel time and delay, goods damage, and a host 
of other variables. The choice of mode used in 
transporting goods is largely based on desired 
trade-off between speed and cost. Discernable 
shifts in modal choices have been occurring. For 
some time, domestic truck transportation has 
been the dominant mode in value of shipments 
and tons shipped. Recently, motor carriage has 
eclipsed rail as the leader in the category of ton- 
miles shipped.
Goods and raw materials shipped to factories 
and wholesale and retail outlets throughout the 
nation generated almost 2.7 trillion ton-miles in 
1997 compared with 2.4 trillion ton-miles in 1993 
(USDOC 1999). Most modes showed an increase 
in ton-miles. Shipments by air (including those 
involving truck and air) grew the most in ton-
miles (55.5 percent), followed by parcel, postal, 
or courier services (36.8 percent), and truck (17.7 
percent). Ton-miles by rail (including truck and 
rail) increased by 8.5 percent and ton-miles by 
water decreased by 3.8 percent.
BRIEF HISTORY OF 
MODAL DEVELOPMENT
To better appreciate the roles currently played 
by the various modes of domestic transportation, 
it would be helpful to briefly review their origins 
and growth patterns.
Development of Waterways
Before the American Revolution, much of the 
trade and commerce of the thirteen colonies was 
carried on small ships that sailed up and down 
the Atlantic Coast. Early in the nineteenth 
century, improvements were made along some of 
the rivers leading to the Atlantic so that they 
could carry waterborne commerce. By the 1850s, 
much of the United States east of the Mississippi
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River was served by an elaborate network of 
barge canals. Many were constructed before the 
railroads. Others were built later to compete 
directly with the railroads. Many of the 
railroads’ business practices were aimed directly 
at driving the competing waterway carriers out 
of business. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, domestic water transportation had 
virtually disappeared, except on the Great 
Lakes.
Starting in the 1930s, massive federal 
improvements to the Tennessee and Mississippi 
Rivers, which included dams for flood control 
and power generation as well as locks for 
passage of barges, combined with enforcement of 
laws aimed at railroad predatory pricing 
practices, inland waterway transportation began 
to revive. Established in 1925 by Congress, the 
Army Corp of Engineers continues to be the 
agency that provides most of the federal 
expenditures for river and harbor improvements. 
In 1997, 563 million tons of cargo was moved by 
water (USDOC Census FTD 1997). In 1997, 57 
percent of domestic tons moved on the inland 
waterways, 24 percent moved coastwise, and 11 
percent moved on lakes (the rest was local and 
intraterritorial traffic). Lake and inland 
waterway movement increased by 13 percent and 
7 percent, respectively, over this period, while 
coastwise movement declined by 19 percent 
(USACE 1998).
Port performance is typically measured by 
annual cargo throughput. In 1997, 150 ports 
handled more than 1 million tons of cargo, and 
31 ports handled over 10 million tons. While 
waterborne trade accounted for more than three- 
quarters of the tonnage of U.S. international 
trade in 1997, its share of the value of U.S. trade 
declined from 62 percent in 1980 to 40 percent in 
1997(USDOC Census 1994, Table 1062; USDOC 
Census FTD 1997). Among the factors that 
explain this decline are greater land trade with 
Canada and Mexico and the demand for faster 
delivery of high-value commodities, which has 
increased air trade. In 1997, maritime ports on
the west coast of the United States accounted for 
42 percent of the value of U.S. waterborne trade 
with other countries compared with only 24 
percent in 1980. East coast ports’ share bv 
value, however, declined from 41 percent to 38 
percent over this period (remaining relatively 
stable in the last 5 years), and the share of value 
for Gulf ports also dropped from 33 percent to 18 
percent (USDOC Census 1997, Table 1069; 
USDOT MARAD 1998).
Increased trade with Asian Pacific countries 
between 1980 and 1997 helps explain this east to 
west coast shift. The financial crisis impacting 
several Asian economies, beginning in the second 
half of 1997, caused a slight decrease in overall 
merchandise trade by west coast ports. Between 
1996 and 1997, the value of total international 
trade by west coast ports decreased 1.5 percent 
compared with a 0.4 percent decrease for east 
coast ports. Because of the appreciation of the 
U.S. dollar in relation to several Asian 
currencies, imports through west coast ports 
increased 3 percent between 1996 and 1997, 
while exports declined 12 percent.
The majority of west coast waterborne trade 
transits the ports of Long Beach and Los 
Angeles. Long Beach is also the leading U.S. port 
both by value and for containerized trade, as 
measured by the number of 20-foot equivalent 
units (TEUs) handled. Ini 997, $85 billion worth 
of international trade passed through the port of 
Long Beach, and the port handled 2.7 million 
TEUs (USDOC Census FTD 1997). Other west 
coast ports such as Los Angeles, Seattle, and 
Tacoma are also important gateways for U.S. 
trade with Asia. The port of New York/New 
Jersey is the east coast leader in both the value 
of trade ($68 billion) and in the number of 
containers (1.7 million TEUs) handled in 1997. 
Charleston and Norfolk are also major east coast 
container ports. The importance of Gulf ports 
(e.g., Houston and South Louisiana) in the trade 
of bulk commodities and crude petroleum can be 
seen from their listing as the top two U.S. ports 
by tonnage.
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Development of Railroads
The first railroad in the United States was the 
Baltimore and Ohio (B&O), incorporated in 1827. 
The next year construction was started, using 
the standard English track gauge—which is still 
used today—of 56.5 inches between rails. In 
1830, the first steam engine operated over a 
thirteen-mile stretch of B&O track.
The strength, speed, durability, and year-round 
availability of the railroad (waterways often 
freeze during winter) made it the dominant form 
of transportation. Its growth was spectacular. 
From 40 miles of track in 1840, railroads 
expanded over 31,000 miles by the start of the 
Civil War (Kirkland 1951). Trackage peaked a 
hundred years later at 152,000 miles, dropping 
to about 115,000 by 1990. Improved techno­
logies, such as automatic couplers, air brakes, 
and diesel-powered locomotives facilitated the 
growth of railroads. In the decade between 1862 
and 1872, Congress enacted several land-grant 
programs, giving railroads free land, usually 
alternating sections, each section a square mile 
or 640 acres, in a checkerboard pattern for six 
miles on each side of the track (Wood and 
Johnson 1996). Land was granted to accelerate 
westward development of railroads. However, 
the railroads accepting the grants had to agree to 
charge lower rates to the federal government for 
carrying freight and passengers—military traffic 
and personnel.
With the advent of the Interstate Highway 
System in the 1950s, truckers gained a distinct 
cost advantage over railroads, under the existing 
system of regulated rates, on hauls up to 500-600 
miles in length. However, we have seen a 
resurgence of railroads since deregulation in 
1980. Revenue ton-miles reached 1,349 billion in 
1997, an increase of 47 percent since 1980, 
although revenue-ton miles increased only 16 
percent in the eastern United States, but 
climbed to 68 percent in the western United 
States (AAR 1998, p. 61).
Intermodal (trailer or container on flatcar) and 
coal are the largest categories of rail traffic, each
accounting for approximately one-quarter of the 
carloadings of the railroad industry. Intermodal 
traffic increased from 3.1 million loadings in 
1980 to 8.7 million in 1997 (AAR 1998). The 
introduction of double stack container trains in 
the early 1980s played a major role in this 
growth. Since the late 1970s, when the Powder 
River Basin opened in Wyoming, coal shipments 
grew from 4.4 million carloads in 1978 to 6.7 
million carloads in 1997, reflecting the increased 
demand for low sulfur western coal by electric 
utilities to comply with clean air standards (AAR 
1998). A combination of chemicals, motor 
vehicles and equipment, and farm products 
account for roughly 20 percent of rail traffic.
Development of Pipelines
In August 1859, close to Oil Creek, near 
Titusville, Pennsylvania, Colonel Edwin Drake 
drilled the first commercially successful oil well. 
Both waterway and wagon transportation of oil 
had limitations overcome by a dedicated 
pipeline. Samuel Van Syckel built the first suc­
cessful pipeline in 1865 (Johnson 1956). It 
reached five miles from Oil Creek to the Oil 
Creek Railroad. The pipe came in 15-foot 
sections that had to be screwed together. It was 
laid on the ground, although in some areas it 
was buried below the level reached by plowing. 
With three steam-powered pumps, it was able to 
transport 80 barrels, or 3,360 gallons, per hour. 
It could move as much as 300 teamsters could 
transport in a day.
At first, railroads did not object to pipelines, 
because they were relatively short—less than ten 
miles—and were primarily used to bring oil to 
the railroad collection points. The first trunk 
line, from Bear Creek, Pennsylvania to 
Pittsburgh was six inches in diameter and 
transported 10,000 barrels per day over its 108- 
mile length (Johnson 1956).
The emergence of John D. Rockefeller’s Standard 
Oil Company in the 1870s triggered a war for 
control of both oil and natural gas pipelines. By 
1890, Standard had a virtual monopoly on 
pipeline transportation. Today there are over
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half-a-million miles of pipeline in the United 
States, working with minimum labor and risk 24 
hours a day, seven days a week, transporting 
crude and refined oil, natural gas, slurry, and 
other commodities. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
is the largest diameter pipeline in the United 
States at 48 inches.
Development of Trucking
In 1896 the first self-propelled trucks began 
appearing in the United States. By 1898 a 
limited amount of competition was present 
among the several manufacturers of “motor 
delivery wagons.” By 1902 the horse versus 
truck controversy was in full bloom.
General Motors Truck Company advertised, 
“During the next three months it will be no 
unusual sight to see horses dropping dead on the 
streets, having succumbed to the heat... The 
beauty of the motor truck is that it is not 
affected by the heat” (Karolevitz 1966). G.M.C. 
issued full-page advertisements to illustrate this 
point, showing ten different pictures of horses 
dying in the streets, attended by their anguished 
owners. A later advertisement for trucks 
stressed their economy over “Old Dobbin.” The 
lead sentence read, “1 GMC, 1 Driver, Displaces 
16 Horses, 4 Drivers, 4 Wagons” (Karolevitz 
1966). By 1911 there were about 25,000 trucks 
in operation.
Both the pursuit of Pancho Villa into Mexico in 
1916 and World War I provided great stimuli to 
the motor truck industry. As an indication of the 
general acceptance of trucks after World War I,
335,000 trucks were produced in 1920. The 
replacement of the wooden wheels and solid 
rubber tires with steel wheels and pneumatic 
tires enormously increased truck carrying 
capacity, speed and smoothness of ride. In the 
1920s trucks performed mainly drayage 
operations to and from railroads. By 1925 about 
2.5 million trucks were in operation. In the 
1930s the industry developed intercity markets 
and began to compete with the railroads.
Trucking (for-hire and private) moves more of 
the nation’s freight, whether measured by value, 
tons, and ton-miles, than any other mode 
(USDOC Census 1999). In 1997, trucks 
transported $5.0 trillion of freight, a 13 percent 
increase over 1993 (in constant 1997 dollars). 
Truck shipments accounted for 72 percent of the 
total value of shipments in 1997. Measured by 
value of shipment, trucking was followed by 
parcel, postal, and courier services; rail; pipeline, 
if crude oil is included; air; and water in 1997.
While the shipment value per ton increased 
overall between 1993 and 1997, it decreased for 
trucking from $755 to $690 per ton (in constant 
1997 dollars). The average reflects the wide 
range of commodities moved by truck—from 
sand and gravel, coal, and grain to electronic 
equipment and pharmaceuticals. Interestingly, 
the average value per ton of rail shipments (as a 
single mode) increased from $175 in 1993 to $210 
in 1997 (USDOC Census 1997).
Development of Aviation
There was great interest in the development of 
powered aircraft at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The first successful flight 
was in late 1903 at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. 
Wilbur and Orville Wright, two brothers who 
had a bicycle business in Dayton, Ohio, 
accomplished this feat. Their first flight lasted 
only a minute, but by 1905 the Wright brothers 
were making flights lasting as long as thirty 
minutes. In the early days of World War I, 
aircraft were used primarily for observation. 
Before the end of the war, aircraft were being 
used as fighters and bombers. With government 
subsidies to carry the mail, the domestic airline 
industry began in the mid-1920s. The first U.S. 
aircraft designed primarily to carry passengers 
was the Ford Trimotor, introduced in 1926 
(Woods and Johnson 1996). Because of the high 
cost of air transportation, the airlines have not 
been a major factor in commercial cargo 
transport, except for selective high value, 
perishable, or extremely time sensitive
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TABLE 1
VALUE OF SHIPMENTS
Domestic and Export-Bound Freight Shipments Within the U.S.
1997
Value
1997 % of
Total Value
1997 vs. 1993
Growth in Value (%)
Truck 4,982 71.7 13.1
PPC 856 12.3 51.9
Other/Unk 368 5.3 7.9
Rail 320 4.6 29.2
Air 229 3.3 64.7
Pipeline 113 1.6 26.3
Water 76 1.1 23.1
Total 6,944 100.0 18.8
Value of Shipments in SBillions, inflation-adjusted 
PPC = Parcel, postal, and courier
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 1997 Commodity Flow
Survey: United States, EC97TCF-US (Washington DC: 1999)
TABLE 2 
TONS SHIPPED
Domestic and Export-Bound Freight Shipments Within the U.S.
1997
Tons
1997 % of
Total Tons
1997 vs. 1993 
Growth in Tons (%)
Truck 7,700 69.4 20.6
Rail 1,550 14.0 0.4
Other/Unk 630 5.7 -15.7
Pipeline 618 5.6 27.8
Water 563 5.1 11.5
PPC 24 0.2 25.4
Air 4 0.0 42.6
Total 11,089 69.4 14.5
Tons of Shipments in Millions 
PPC = Parcel, postal, and courier
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 1997 Commodity Flow
Survey: United States, EC97TCF-US (Washington DC: 1999)
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TABLE 3
TON-MILES SHIPPED
Domestic and Export-Bound Freight Shipments Within the U.S.
1997
Tons-Miles
1997 % of
Total
1997 vs. 1993
Growth (%)
Truck 1,024 38.5 17.7
Rail 1,022 38.4 8.5
Water 262 9.8 -3.8
Pipeline (*1) (*1) (*1), (*2)
Other/Unk 329 12.4 (*2)
PPC 18 0.7 36.8
Air 6 0.2 55.5
Total 2,661 100.0 9.9
(*1) CFS data restated in December 1999 to exclude crude oil shipments by pipeline 
(*2) Category component changed in 1997 survey not comparable to 1993 survey
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 1997 Commodity Flow
Survey: United States, EC97TCF-US (Washington DC: 1999)
commodities. There are a few all-cargo airlines, 
like FedEx, UPS, and DHL. They principally 
handle overnight delivery of small packages. 
Otherwise air cargoes move on scheduled 
passenger aircraft operated by Northwest, 
United, Delta, American, and others. Usually 
shipments need to originate and terminate in 
trucks, making airlines a speedier alternative to 
truck transportation only over long distances.
Airfreight moves both by all-cargo carriers and 
carriers that transport passengers. Between 
1980 and 1997, airfreight’s share of the value of 
U.S. international merchandise trade increased 
from 16 percent to nearly 28 percent (USDOT 
BTS 1998). Commodities that move by air tend 
to be high in value—air’s share of U.S. trade by 
weight was less than 1 percent in 1997. Western 
European and Asian Pacific countries dominate 
airfreight to and from the United States. The 
top three countries by value of airfreight with 
the United States are Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and Singapore. New York’s John F. 
Kennedy (JFK) International Airport was the
leading gateway for shipments into and out of 
the United States by all modes, accounting for 
over $89 billion in 1997 (USI)OC Census 1997). 
Following JFK in shipment volume were the 
airports of Chicago, Los Angeles, and San 
Francisco.
CHANGING SHIPMENT CATEGORIES
Parcels, Postal and Courier Shipments
Business establishments in the United States 
shipped much more commercial freight on the 
nation’s transportation system in 1997 than in 
1993, the two most recent years for which 
comprehensive freight data are available 
(USDOC Census 1997). While parcel, postal and 
courier shipments comprised a very small 
amount of the 11 billion tons moved in 1997, only 
two-tenths of a percent or 24 million tons, these 
shipments represented over 12% of the nearly $8 
trillion in total value of shipments. This equates 
to $2.4 billion per day in value of shipments in 
this category. This category of shipment grew
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significantly between 1993 and 1997: 52% in 
value of shipments, 25% in tons, and over 36% in 
ton-miles (USDOC Census 1997). The pheno­
menal growth in this category is likely due to 
Internet-based sales that are delivered by U.S. 
mail, and companies like Federal Express and 
UPS.
Multimodal Shipments
Multimodal transportation (shipments reported 
as moving by more than one mode) increased 
substantially in value between 1993 and 1997 
from $932 billion to $1.2 trillion (in constant 
1997 dollars), or 31% (USDOC 1999). Multi­
modal shipments declined in both tons and ton- 
miles by 14% and 2%, respectively. These 
shipments are typically international shipments. 
Air, land, and water modes are all-important in 
transporting goods in U.S. international trade. 
The leading gateway overall in 1997 was JFK 
International Airport in New York with $89 
billion of activity (USDOT BTS 1998). This was 
followed by the water port of Long Beach, 
California, which handled $85 billion worth of 
shipments, and Detroit, Michigan, a land 
gateway with $83 billion worth of shipments in 
1997 (USDOT BTS 1998). Changes in the mix of 
commodities traded internationally, geographic 
shifts in centers of production, global trade 
patterns, and many other factors will continue to 
affect these gateways as well as the movement of 
international trade shipments to, from, and 
within the United States.
Local Versus Long-Haul Freight
Freight shipments can be categorized as local 
(less than 100 miles), intra-regional (between 
100 and 1,000 miles), and interregional (over
1,000 miles). In 1997, local shipments consti­
tuted nearly 67 percent of the weight (7.7 billion 
tons), 40 percent of the value ($3 trillion), but 
only 9 percent of the ton-miles (254 billion) of all 
U.S. shipments, about the same proportion of the 
value, tons, and ton-miles identified in 1993 
(USDOT BTS 1998).
Intra-regional shipments in 1997 accounted for 
45 percent of the value of goods shipments ($3.4 
trillion), 29 percent of the tons (3.3 billion tons), 
and 62 percent of the ton-miles (1.7 trillion). 
Interregional shipments accounted for a 
relatively small proportion of the total tonnage 
(4.4 percent in 1997), but they have had a large 
impact on the U.S. transportation system and 
the tonnage of such shipments has grown 
rapidly. In 1997, longer haul shipments 
accounted for 29 percent of the ton-miles, about 
the same proportion as in 1993. Nevertheless, 
the tonnage moving such long distances grew 
about 40 percent, with value increasing nearly 
30 percent in real terms (USDOT BTS 1998).
Shipments of Major Commodities
Merchandise in the category “electronic, other 
electrical equipment and components, and office 
equipment” accounted for the highest dollar 
value ($925 billion) of U.S. shipments in 1997, 
followed by motorized and other vehicles 
(including parts); textiles, leather, and articles of 
textiles and leather; and miscellaneous 
manufactured products (USDOT BTS 1998). It 
should be noted that the Department of 
Transportation discontinued reporting crude oil 
shipments and does not include values or 
volumes of crude oil shipments made by pipeline 
or water in its reports.
As for total tonnage shipped, the top commodity 
groups were gravel and crushed stone (1.8 billion 
tons), coal and coal products, gasoline and 
aviation fuel, and nonmetallic mineral products. 
Although gravel and crushed stone accounted for 
16 percent of total tons, shipments in this 
category accounted for less than 1 percent of the 
value and about 4 percent of the ton-miles of all 
shipments, impacting mostly local transporta­
tion.
The transportation of coal generated the most 
ton-miles (520 billion), followed by cereal grains, 
gasoline and aviation fuel, and prepared 
foodstuffs. Coal produced the most ton-miles
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because, unlike gravel and stone, which move 
mostly in local areas, coal is often shipped long 
distances. Coal mined in Wyoming and Montana 
is transported nationwide. In 1997, a ton of coal 
was shipped 416 miles on average, compared 
with 55 miles for a ton of gravel and crushed 
stone (USDOT BTS 1998).
Shipment Size
Freight shipments are divided into several 
weight categories: less than 100 pounds, 100 to 
999 pounds, 1,000 to 49,999 pounds, and over
50,000 pounds. In 1997, the value of U.S. 
shipments under 100 pounds exceeded $1.1 
trillion, 37 percent greater than in 1993 (USDOC 
Census 1997). Growth in parcel, postal, and 
courier services and an increase in just-in-time 
production and distribution systems are partly 
responsible for this rise in smaller size 
shipments. Shipments of less than 100 pounds 
are often high-value, time-sensitive commodities 
transported by truck and air intermodal 
combinations, or by truck alone. In 1997, such 
small-size shipments accounted for 15 percent of 
the value of shipments, little different from the 
13 percent in 1993 (USDOT BTS 1998).
Large-size shipments (over 50,000 pounds) 
accounted for nearly 66 percent of the ton-miles, 
56 percent of tons shipped, but only 12 percent of 
the value of shipments in 1997. The relative 
share of large-size shipments fell slightly 
between 1993 and 1997 in value, tons, and ton- 
miles (USDOC Census 1997).
MAJOR INFLUENCING FACTORS
The Role of the Digital Economy
The real purpose of a supply chain is not to help 
companies get rid of products in their inventories 
but to help customers find and acquire them 
efficiently. Electronic commerce (e-commerce) 
has significantly changed the way companies “go 
to market.” The Internet provides an oppor­
tunity for supply chains to work 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week, in all countries using the 
language of the customer to effect an exchange of
values. The power of the Internet lies in its 
capability to connect companies, their trading 
partners and consumers easily, quickly and 
inexpensively. The impact of the Internet on the 
supply chain is nothing less than profound in its 
contribution to improved planning, improved 
asset management, shorter cycle times, tailored 
product positioning, and customer service. 
Adoption of the new technologies that enable this 
capability has been at a remarkably fast rate.
The concepts of aggregation of purchases, 
inventories, orders and shipments and slower 
cycle times to achieve logistics economies are 
being challenged by the e-commerce enabled 
supply chain concepts of make-to-customized 
order, transact in units of one or a few, and 
complete the fulfillment within hours, not weeks. 
This results in customer expectations of 
“overnight deliveries,” and will shift truckload to 
less-than-truckload deliveries and dramatically 
increase the freight moved by parcel delivery 
companies.
Shifts in the U.S. economy toward more services 
and high-value, low-weight products are 
influencing the mix of commodities, even as 
overall shipments increase. Such shifts affect 
the average value by unit of weight of 
commodities shipped (e.g., personal computers 
have a much higher value per ton than lumber). 
On average, a ton of goods shipped in 1997 was 
valued at $580, a slight increase from $563 in 
1993 (both in constant 1997 dollars) (USDOT 
BTS 1998).
The Role of Third Party Logistics Providers
Companies have long recognized that it is to 
their advantage to outsource functions and 
activities that do not matter much from a 
business perspective, such as the operation of 
the company cafeteria and provision of janitorial 
services. Companies have expanded this 
thinking to include logistics functions, believing 
it is appropriate to outsource activities that some 
other firm can do better than they can. The 
providers of services for transportation
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FIGURE 1
ABSORPTION RATES OF NEW 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES ARE ACCELERATING
The following is the time it took (or is taking) for these technologies to reach the 10 million customer 
mark after being introduced to the mass market.
| 41 years 
38 years 
25 years 
22 years 
9 years 
9 years 
7 years 
6 years 
6 years*
6 months**
*Based on a forecast through 1999 
**38 million in 18 months
Sources: USA Today, Info Tech, Pac Tel Cellular and Netscape Communications (Keebler et al., 1999)
management, warehousing, order handling and 
other logistics activities are called third-party 
logistics providers, or 3PL’s.
Third-party logistics providers enable firms to 
achieve reduced operating costs and increased 
revenues in new and existing markets (Keebler 
and Durtsche 2001). 3PL’s provide firms an 
opportunity to enhance their market value by 
reducing a company’s ownership of assets, which 
translates to a higher return on remaining assets 
and greater return on stockholder investment. 
3PL’s also bring to the relationship their 
specialized expertise in managing logistics with
contemporary technology and systems. The 
COO’s decision to outsource company logistics 
operations to the 3PL is often justified solely on 
the favorable difference between the more 
efficient 3PL’s price for the services and the 
firm’s higher costs of existing operations. The 
chief marketing officer views the enhanced 
services and distribution reach of 3PL’s in 
existing and new markets as translating into 
increased sales and better long-term 
relationships with customers. CFO’s are 
delighted to see assets—property, plant, equip­
ment, and even inventory—disappear from the 
firm’s balance sheet, freeing up cash for more
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productive uses, instantaneously and 
“permanently” improving the company’s returns 
on assets. CIO’s are often very pleased to have 
access to the 3PL’s systems and technology 
resources, avoiding the cost and trauma of 
upgrading their own. Reliance on the 3PL 
alliance frees up company employees to focus on 
their core competencies, doing more of what they 
are good at and less of what can be done better 
by the 3PL. Chief logistics officers begin to 
realize that ownership of resources is not 
necessary to achieve control over the results.
Third-party logistics providers with sophis­
ticated data base management systems and 
competency in activity-based costing can secure 
long-term alliances with their customers and 
their trading partners. Firms value timely, 
accurate, comprehensive, and actionable data 
about the activities that constitute their sourcing 
and fulfillment processes, whether it is used for 
planning, scheduling, measurement, costing, or 
pricing purposes. Successful third-party pro­
viders supply this knowledge. Under gain 
sharing arrangements, the firm and its 3PL 
partner can implement improvements that result 
in lower costs and share the benefits on an 
equitable basis. There remains a great 
opportunity for this alliance to involve the firm’s 
trading partners in the gain sharing program. 
Changes by suppliers and customers in how and 
where the work gets done can produce additional 
logistics savings that can be shared by all. 
Third-party logistics providers are seen as key 
facilitators of supply chain management.
The selection and integration of a capable 3PL 
requires managerial skill in establishing and 
maintaining trusting, long-term relationships. 
It also requires a continued investment in the 
success of each party, based on a strategic and 
systemic perspective of the interdependencies 
and potential of the alliance.
In today’s competitive market place what 
distinguishes winners from losers is the ability 
to differentiate themselves through their service 
and product offerings. For many firms, the 
service differentiation is accomplished by how
well the logistics process is managed. To achieve 
excellence in logistics, successful firms ensure 
that the key logistics processes are aligned with 
the firm’s business strategy and measured 
against predetermined performance objectives. 
Additionally, the top firms are jointly defining 
the specifics of each measure with their trading 
partners (customers / suppliers / 3PL’s) to create 
a common understating of expectations. While 
some firms are developing their measurement 
capability internally, a number are turning to 
3PL’s to support their needs. As focused service 
providers, 3PL’s are ideally positioned to bring 
the systems, process design, and managerial 
expertise to aid in establishing and imple­
menting a comprehensive logistics management 
effort. The 3PL is also often in the position to 
act as a catalyst for meaningful dialog between 
trading partners to establish a level of service 
performance that truly adds value.
The Role of Global Supply Chains
Changes in how and where goods are produced, 
and increase in international trade, have 
contributed to the rise in freight tonnage and 
ton-miles over the past few years. For example, 
the manufacture, assembly, and sale of a single 
product may involve several different facilities 
located hundreds or even thousands of miles 
apart.
The importance of international trade to the U.S. 
economy can be seen in the increased value of 
U.S. merchandise trade in recent decades. 
Between 1980 and 1997, the real-dollar value of 
U.S. merchandise trade more than tripled, from 
$496 billion to $1.7 trillion (in 1997 dollars). In 
addition, the ratio of the value of U.S. 
merchandise trade relative to U.S. GDP doubled 
from about 11 percent in 1980 to 23 percent in 
1997 (USDOC ITA 1999).
During the past two decades, changes can be 
seen in the geography of trade. Trade with 
Asian Pacific countries grew greatly. In 1997, 
five Asian countries were among the top-10 U.S. 
trading partners, despite a slight downturn in 
trade in the second half of 1997 related to
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economic problems in the region. These five 
countries accounted for 26 percent of overall U.S. 
trade in 1997, up from 17 percent in 1980 
(USDOC Census FTD 1997). Canada and 
Mexico were the first and third largest U.S. 
trading partners in 1980 and in 1997. While the 
rankings remained the same, the U.S. trade 
relationship with these two countries deepened. 
In 1980, Canada and Mexico together accounted 
for 22 percent of all U.S. trade by value. By 
1997, this had increased to over 30 percent 
(USDOC Census FTD 1997). Canada accounts 
for approximately 20 percent and Mexico 10 
percent of U.S. merchandise trade. U.S. trade 
with Mexico has grown more quickly than with 
Canada, and in 1997 Mexico surpassed Japan as 
the second largest market for U.S. merchandise 
exports (although Mexico remained the third 
largest trading partner overall). Between 1993 
and 1997, trade with North American FTee Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) partners increased 62 
percent in current dollars, from $293 billion to 
$475 billion. During this same period, U.S. trade 
with Mexico grew most rapidly, almost doubling 
from $81 billion in 1993 to $157 billion in 1997 
(USDOC 1998, table 1323; USDOC Census FTD 
1997).
Changes over the past two decades also occurred 
in the commodities traded. Higher value manu­
factured goods now dominate U.S. trade, 
accounting for $1.3 trillion or 85 percent of the 
value of all merchandise trade in 1997 (USDOC 
ITA 1999). Of these goods, motor vehicles, 
computers, telecommunications equipment, and 
aircraft are among the top U.S. import and 
export commodities by value. While the value of 
manufactured goods increased as a share of U.S. 
trade, the share of agricultural commodities 
declined from 13 percent in 1980 to 6 percent in 
1997. Mineral fuels accounted for approximately 
6 percent of the value of U.S. trade in 1997, 
primarily imports of crude petroleum and 
petroleum products (USDOC ITA 1999).
In terms of commodities, motor vehicles and 
motor vehicle parts and accessories dominate 
trade between all of the North American 
countries. Other leading North American trade
commodities include consumer electronics, 
telecommunications equipment, and aircraft 
equipment and parts. In addition, crude 
petroleum, natural gas, and petroleum products 
are important U.S. imports from both Canada 
and Mexico. Mexico is also a chief source of U.S. 
imports of clothing and textiles, while paper 
products, furniture, and wood products are 
among leading U.S. imports from Canada.
In their search for new markets and customers 
as well as more favorable sources of supply and 
production sites, U.S. companies have been 
pursuing globalization strategies as a means of 
insuring access to resources and growth in 
revenues. Joint ventures and strategic alliances 
with trading partners around the world are 
characteristic today of major American 
companies. Elimination of country tariffs and 
quotas and simplification of trade documentation 
have been pursued by the U.S. government and 
trade organizations. Market defensive strategies 
are being replaced by market prospecting 
strategies where the goal is to establish sup­
portive, interdependent business relationships 
and influence emerging industries, technologies 
and supply chains.
Application of Technologies
Technologies exist today that can be used to 
create more effective and efficient supply chains. 
Examples include bar coding, scanning, data 
warehousing and data mining architectures and 
software systems, and use of the Internet to 
connect trading partners and customers. 
Applications of radio frequency and computer 
directed storage and handling systems, of 
satellite supported ground positioning systems 
(GPS) for tracking and expediting shipments, 
and of point of sale and point of use capture of 
demand data are examples of‘new’ technologies 
being used. Progress toward improved supply 
chain management does not appear to be limited 
or propelled by available technology as much as 
the capability and desire of management to 
establish strategic, and mutually beneficial 
multi-firm relationships.
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CONCLUSION
As the U. S. economy continues to grow, so does 
the demand for transportation services. Truck 
transportation is the dominant mode, accounting 
for 69% of 1997 tonnage. The nearly 15% increase 
in domestics tons shipped between 1993 and 1997 
can be attributed to trucking, which grew by 20% 
over the same period.
The way companies go to market, increasingly 
moving smaller shipments faster to meet shorter 
fulfillment cycle times, is having a visible impact 
on the domestic transportation trends. Today, 
Internet based catalogues offer everything from 
consumer electronics, luxury goods, sporting gear, 
freshly produced foods, prescription medicines, 
and replacement parts. Demanding customers are 
expecting overnight delivery of this Internet based 
e-commerce. This can occur out of a network of 
market-based distribution centers filled with 
inventory, or more cheaply out of fewer fulfillment 
hubs, requiring much less inventory, where 
overnight delivery is still possible. Parcel express 
companies, like Federal Express and UPS are 
developing sophisticated new software for 
customer order fulfillment and electronic 
warehousing at strategic “pick and pack” hubs. 
Orders placed today over the Internet can be 
delivered anywhere in the US from locations in 
Seattle, Memphis or Lexington. International 
shipments can be cleared by customs 
electronically before they land, overnight or the 
next day, in the destination country. Pick up and 
delivery carriers can be coordinated electronically 
on both ends to schedule the quickest and least 
expensive movements.
The supply chains of tomorrow will be supported 
by virtual logistics networks where manufac­
turers and their suppliers and customers, repair 
vendors, delivery companies, and logistics service 
providers will be connected electronically via 
virtual data centers and web interfaces on the 
Internet. Internet based collaborative rela­
tionships will provide enterprise-wide and supply 
chain visibility for improved planning and 
execution.
As we head into this new millennium, the 
movement toward globalization, with emerging
markets, cheaper supply sources, and new trading 
partners, is compelling enterprises of all sizes to 
build alliances and on-line commerce systems that 
efficiently deliver products to customers while 
providing a worldwide view of operations. Virtual 
along with traditional organizations are de­
veloping new strategies to track orders and react 
to changes in real time in handling and trans­
porting materials as they move across the supply 
chain from originating suppliers to end 
customers.
The goal is to electronically link the entire 
forecasting, planning, sales, procurement, 
production, delivery, freight payment and revenue 
collection processes into one seamless flow of 
information across national borders, time zones, 
and differing languages, creating a global view of 
the supply chain flows. Transportation and 
fulfillment providers, including Federal Express, 
UPS, Sea Land, DHL and SkyWay, are opening 
up their systems allowing e-commerce vendors to 
access, track, and communicate logistics informa­
tion in a variety of innovative ways. Web casting 
and publish/subscribe techniques allow all 
interested parties to be alerted to situations 
requiring their attention. This includes changes 
in customer demand, order revisions and 
cancellations, adjustments in quantity and/or 
locations for deliveries in progress, customs 
clearance problems, and on-time delivery or 
installation issues. An integrated, virtual 
solution can diagnose when a critical piece of 
equipment is about to fail, can tell when a hub is 
short of replacement or repair parts, and also can 
locate the source of the problem, whether it is due 
to an enroute delivery, warehouse situation, or 
change in the scope of an order.
These new Internet-based solutions have the 
potential to all but eliminate the strategic role of 
distribution centers for replacement parts, 
putting the emphasis on moving information, not 
parts. This new capability provides for dynamic 
decision opportunities, or fixing problems before 
they arise.
Automated online personalities that emulate hu­
man customer service representatives will become 
widespread in the Internet at a much lower cost 
than traditional support functions. These web-
12 Journal of Transportation Management
based “virtual reps” will be able to react to 
customer inquiries and handle frequently asked 
questions twenty-four hours a day, seven days a 
week, in any language.
Internet-based, extra enterprise-wide e-com- 
merce applications are part of a fundamental shift 
in how computing is being applied to the business 
of managing logistics across the trading land­
scape. New strategies and software to support
those strategies are being developed, tested and 
implemented in order to help companies find the 
best balance between demand opportunities and 
supply constraints while enabling effective, con­
trolled logistics execution. As trading partners 
work together to improve the overall performance 
of their supply chain, they are beginning to 
discover the solution might just be a virtual 
reality.
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ABSTRACT
The research reported in this manuscript provides several insights regarding the specific 
behaviors and traits of transportation salespersons as sought by a sample of shippers. 
Shippers in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries were asked to evaluate 
the importance of 30 potential salesperson characteristics. Overall, dependability, ethical 
conduct, honesty, provision of regular service, and solution selling were ranked as the most 
important (“must have”) characteristics. In addition to the overall rankings, t-tests were used 
to compare the manufacturing and non-manufacturing groups and ANOVA tests were used 
to compare the responses of shippers which were grouped by number of contacts from 
salespersons.
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INTRODUCTION
What are the critical traits and behaviors that a 
salesperson should exhibit in his/her interre­
lationships with various customer groups? 
According to an interview reported in Sales and 
Marketing Management magazine, buyers seek 
salespeople who “exude integrity’ (honest and 
trustworthy), who know their product, 
applications and industry (something of an 
expert), who listen and custom design a solution, 
conduct follow-up activities in a timely fashion, 
work for the benefit of both the buying and 
selling organizations, and who are excellent 
communicators (Kaydo 2000). Kaydo further 
contends that the common mistakes salespeople 
make include: not being knowledgeable of their 
product, failing to evaluate and understand the 
company with which they are dealing, focusing 
only on price, not following through on 
commitments, not making appointments, not 
having an agenda, and not working to fit into the 
consuming firm’s priorities. Based on the 
anecdotal evidence reported, it would seem that 
the key qualitites of a “good” salesperson are: 
honesty, knowledge, ability to adapt to the 
customer’s situation, being dependable, allowing 
and encouraging customer input, and providing 
true solutions.
As Garver and Mentzer (2000) point out, in the 
area of business logistics, the sales “interface is 
becoming increasingly important.” Thus, it 
would seem that a listing of the traits and 
behaviors that are desired by buyers could be 
important for numerous reasons. First, one 
could reasonably assume that salespeople who 
possess the traits/behaviors most desired by 
their buyers would also be the ones with whom 
buyers prefer to work and interact. It could then 
be argued that this preference should result in 
more sales, higher profits, greater customer 
satisfaction, etc. Based on this premise, an 
identification of traits/behaviors of salespeople 
could also be valuable to firms as they'engage in 
the selection process. For example, if product 
knowledge is identified as one of the buyer’s 
most critical factors, then selection decisions 
may be predicated upon the applicant’s ability
and/or skills in understanding the product. 
Third, the listing of critical skills may also be 
useful in the development of sales training and 
development programs. If, as stated previously 
(Kaydo 2000), the ability to custom design a 
solution is a critical behavior, then firms should 
train their sales forces in developing custom 
designed solutions. Finally, the development of 
a list of key skills/traits of salespeople may also 
be useful in the development of performance 
appraisal programs. It would seem logical that 
salespeople be evaluated on criteria that are 
critical to their buyers. Using this logic, one 
might argue that salespeople should be assessed 
on their ability to communicate solutions to their 
buyers.
However, while the information provided from 
interviews such as the one from Sales and 
Marketing Management (Kaydo 2000) is 
insightful, valuable, and may be useful in the 
selection, training, and evaluating of salespeople, 
it should be recognized that the definition and 
identification of “good” selling behavior/traits is 
probably largely dependent upon the perceptions 
and positions of the person listing the traits. 
One might find that different individuals 
identify different behaviors/traits as being 
critical to a sales position. Correspondingly, 
individuals in various industries may identify 
unique behaviors/traits as being important in 
their industries. Further, designing selection, 
training, and evaluation programs on the basis 
of a half a dozen interviews would seem tenuous. 
Based on these limitations, the purpose of this 
research is to evaluate the importance of 
alternative salesperson traits and behaviors 
from the perspectives of professional buyers in 
one selected industry, the transportation 
industry. The findings of this research may be 
valuable to firms that target this industry for 
their personal selling efforts. These organiza­
tions may use these findings to guide their sales 
force selection, training, and evaluation 
processes. Thus, businesses that are empha­
sizing personal selling as a significant portion of 
their promotional mixes may be better able to 
identify the critical factors that influence the 
effectiveness of their selling efforts and
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consequently improve their sales results by 
implementing the findings of this study.
RELATED LITERATURE
An assessment of the skills and traits required 
for successful selling can be made from 
numerous vantage points. From one perspective, 
it would seem that performance appraisal 
criteria would emphasize an evaluation of the 
skills/behaviors that would be required for 
success in the sales profession. This viewpoint 
might argue that salespeople should be “graded” 
on criteria that relate to successful performance. 
Jackson, Schlacter and Wolfe (1995) identified 
numerous criteria that they found were used to 
assess salesperson performance. Among these 
criteria were qualitative criteria (sometimes 
referred to as input criteria) which relate to the 
skills that may help a salesperson succeed. The 
results of their research provided the percentage 
with which specific skills were used by managers 
in their evaluations of salesperson performance. 
These sales managers stated that the following 
skills were used in their evaluations of 
salesperson performance: communication (88%), 
product knowledge (85%), attitude (82%), sales 
skills (79%), initiative (76%), appearance (image) 
(75%), competitive knowledge (71%), enthusiasm 
(66%), time management (63%), motivation 
(61%), and ethical behavior (59%). In a similar 
study, the importance of various criteria were 
evaluated (Taylor, Pettijohn and Pettijohn 1999). 
In terms of the traits/behaviors of salespeople, 
the results of this study indicated that sales 
managers believed that the most important 
factors (7 = most important, 1 = least important) 
were product knowledge (4.8), attitude (4.4), 
communication skills, (4.3), selling skills (4.2), 
initiative (3.6), and appearance (3.5). However, 
it may be noted that the Taylor, Pettijohn and 
Pettijohn (1999) study also found some 
differences in the perceptions of salespeople and 
their managers in terms of the qualitative 
criteria that should be emphasized in 
performance appraisals. The results indicated 
that salespeople rated the importance of the 
salesperson behaviors/traits in the following 
manner: product knowledge (5.2), attitude (5.3),
communication skills, (5.1), selling skills (4.7), 
initiative (4.8), and appearance (4.9).
A second method that may be used to identify 
the critical salesperson traits/behaviors that 
relate to successful selling would entail an 
assessment of sales training topics. Firms that 
are interested in facilitating successful perfor­
mance by their sales forces would logically 
provide training in those areas most closely 
aligned with sales success. Most research per­
taining to training topics contends that the 
following topics are important: selling 
techniques, product knowledge, negotiation 
skills, interviewing, and competitive knowledge 
(Chonko, Tanner and Weeks 1993; Del Gaizo 
1987; Kerr and Burzynski 1988). Others argue 
that the training focus should be more 
exclusively on selling skills and topics such as 
self-management and motivation, and sales 
planning (Johnson 1990; Smith 1991). In one 
study, salespeople were asked to identify the 
critical topics that should be included in a sales 
training program. The percentage with which 
certain topics were rated as being important by 
salespeople, which could also be perceived as 
being critical determinants of an effective sales 
presentation, included the presentation (88.3%), 
sales follow-up (80%), ethics (71.7%), relation­
ship selling (63.3%), professionalism (60.6%), 
product knowledge (58.3%), and adaptability 
(48.3%) (Parker, Pettijohn, and Luke 1996).
A third method that may be used in identifying 
critical salesperson behaviors might entail 
asking salespeople to rate the importance of 
alternative behaviors. One study which evalu­
ated the importance of alternative behaviors did 
so by examining alternative tactics in selling, 
from the prospecting stage to closing (Hite and 
Bellizzi 1985). The two topical areas that seem 
to hold the most relevance for the present study 
include the “presentation” and the “follow-up” 
sections. In the presentation section, industrial 
salespeople provided the following importance 
ratings (5 = most important) for various sales 
behaviors/traits: develop a “tailored” sales 
presentation (4.33), ask questions (4.26), help 
the prospect visualize the product offering (4.11),
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speak the prospect’s language (4.09), and 
demonstrate (4.09). With regard to the follow-up 
section of the sales encounter, industrial 
salespeople provided the following importance 
ratings: periodic follow-up of customer satis­
faction (4.54), customer training (4.37), serving 
as a consultant (4.22), and reassuring the 
customer (4.18). Chonko, Caballero, and 
Lumpkin (1990), used a scale to assess the 
salesperson’s behavior in nineteen critical 
dimensions of retail sales behavior. Salespeople 
in this study were graded on aspects such as 
courtesy, customer focus, listening, product 
knowledge, availability, willingness to assist, use 
of questions, attempts to learn about he 
customer’s needs, use of visualization techniques 
in the presentation, demonstration skills, 
willingness to customize solutions, and his/her 
general attitude.
Moncrief (1986) conducted an analysis of critical 
sales behaviors by asking industrial salespeople 
what they did on their jobs. Of interest to the 
present research, the findings identified the 
following behaviors: select products for sales 
calls, prepare sales presentations, introduce new 
products, help clients plan, correct orders, 
handle shipment problems, learn about product 
by working with technicians, make deliveries, 
train customers, provide feedback to employer, 
receive feedback from clients, read trade 
publications, provide technical information, and 
conduct social activities with buyers. A more 
recent analysis identified “critical success 
factors” in sales by identifying behaviors that 
separated “top” sales performers from the 
“bottom” performers (Dwyer, Hill and Martin 
2000). Findings relevant to the present analysis 
showed that “helping the prospect visualize the 
benefits” was a behavior engaged in by top 
performing salespeople. Using “partially 
standardized sales presentations” was a behavior 
engaged in by the low performing salespeople. 
The research concluded that top performing 
salespeople tended to use a more personal and 
customer-oriented approach to selling. These top 
performers also engaged in more “customized” 
presentations that focused on the buyer’s needs.
Conversely, the low performing salespeople 
tended to less personal methods for identifying 
and satisfying needs. The research argues that 
“low performers” focus on product benefits and 
do little to alter their presentations to the 
specific customer needs in a given situation 
(Dwyer, Hill and Martin 2000). In a similar vein, 
qualitative research indicates that logistics 
buyers are seeking salespeople who have 
expertise in several areas, including in their 
product, their firms’ logistics systems and in 
their buyers' businesses and operations. 
Further, buyers in this study indicated that their 
salespeople should be able to handle logistical 
procedures and understand their buyers’ needs. 
Buyers were also described as desiring more of a 
“partnership relationship” with their sales 
representatives (Carver and Mentzer 2000).
It may be noticed that while some degree of 
overlap exists between the traits/behaviors 
described by buyers and sellers as being critical, 
the training topics included in the programs 
discussed, and the ways in which sales 
representatives are evaluated, some differences 
exist. One could argue that some differences 
should always exist, as many aspects of a 
salesperson’s job may not be a portion of the 
buyer-seller dyad. However, it would also seem 
reasonable to assume that the behaviors that are 
deemed critical by the buyer would be topics that 
should also be emphasized in a sales training 
program and correspondingly in the performance 
review process. Reconciling these positions 
requires more than the anecdotal evidence 
garnered from an interview with six buyers 
(Kaydo 2000). In fact, it could be argued that an 
identification of salesperson traits that seem 
most significant to buyers should be completed 
through some form of empirical analysis. The 
purpose of this research is to engage in this 
process by surveying professional buyers of 
shipping services and identifying the relative 
levels of importance of the skills/traits that are 
possessed by the salespeople that contact them 
and their employers. As stated by Garver and 
Mentzer (2000), limited research has evaluated 
the relationship between logistics salespeople
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and their customers. This type of research may 
be valuable not only in the development and 
implementation of sales training programs, but 
also in the salesperson recruitment and selection 
processes. Indeed, an analysis of the buyers’ 
perspectives of the traits and behaviors of sales­
people may provide the catalyst for evaluating 
the effectiveness of both sales training programs 
and individual salespeople.
METHODOLOGY
Literature was reviewed to identify character­
istics of successful salespeople in a wide variety 
of industries. The results of the literature 
review were used to construct questions relating 
to salesperson characteristics which might be 
required of salespeople in the transportation and 
logistics industry. The reviewed research 
suggested that three categories of character­
istics exist. First, intrinsic characteristics, 
which include concepts such as self-motivation, 
knowledge of one’s goals, perseverance, a desire 
for continual training, and a willingness to take 
risks. Second, customer oriented skills, including 
characteristics such as the ability to listen, the 
ability to sell solutions, anticipation of the 
customer’s needs, and building and improving 
customer relations. Third, personal selling char­
acteristics, which include approach and 
involvement techniques, qualifying customers, 
presentation techniques, overcoming objections, 
and closing techniques.
The final questionnaire used in this study 
consisted of thirty questions covering the three 
previously mentioned categories, as well as 
several questions used for developing a 
demographic profile of the respondents. 
Respondents were asked to rate the importance 
of each characteristic on a five point Likert type 
scale with 1 representing “not important” and 5 
representing “must possess.” The questionnaire 
was then sent to a sample of shipping firms for 
evaluation and feedback purposes. Based on this 
feedback, the questionnaire was revised and 
then mailed to a list of 518 companies that used 
truckload shipping services. This list was 
provided by a major transportation company
located in the Midwest. The shipping companies 
used in this study included firms involved in 
retail, manufacturing, services, and specialty 
providers. Of the 518 questionnaires sent, seven 
were returned as being undeliverable, thereby 
reducing the sample size to 511 shippers. A total 
of 114 usable questionnaires were returned 
representing an overall response rate of 22.3 
percent.
RESULTS
The results of this study are presented by 
evaluating mean responses to a set of 30 
salesperson characteristics. While other studies 
have examined salesperson characteristics in a 
variety of industries, this study examines these 
traits from the perception of shippers presently 
using transportation services. The respondents 
consisted of 33 non-manufacturing firms, 79 
manufacturing firms, and two respondents 
opting not to respond to this question. 
Respondents from the two types of companies 
were first asked to provide information on the 
number of transportation sales forces that 
contact their company on a regular basis. The 
response to this inquiry is shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
SALES FORCE CONTACT
Number of
Type of Company Contacts
0-20 21-50 51+
Non-Manufacturing Firms 14 6 12
Manufacturing Firms 35 25 18
Total Contacts 49 31 30
Table 1 shows that 49 of the responding firms 
(42% of non-manufacturing respondents and 44% 
of manufacturing respondents) have regular 
contact with up to 20 firms. Higher numbers of 
contacts are reported by 31 firms (18% of non­
manufacturing respondents and 32% of
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manufacturing respondents) who report regular 
contact with 21-50 firms and 30 firms (36% of 
non-manufacturing respondents and 23% of 
manufacturing respondents) reporting over 50 
regular contacts with various sales forces. Based 
upon these responses, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the companies involved in this 
study have regular contact with a variety of 
different types of salespeople in their daily 
operations.
The respondents were asked to examine the list 
of thirty salesperson behaviors/traits, derived 
from the process described in the methodology, 
and to rate the relative importance of each 
behavior/trait using a Likert-type scale anchored 
with 1 representing “not important” and 5 
representing “must possess.” Overall mean 
scores for each of the characteristics were then 
ranked in descending order from the highest 
level of importance (“must have”) to the lowest 
level of importance (“not important”) and are 
shown in Table 2. Additionally, Table 2 reports 
the mean scores for each characteristic as 
reported by both non-manufacturing and 
manufacturing respondents. These responses 
were then examined for significant differences 
between the manufacturing and non­
manufacturing groupings.
The data reported in Table 2 indicate that the 
respondents regarded 13 of the characteristics 
(based on mean scores of at least 4.0) as being of 
“importance” for a salesperson to possess, while 
the remaining 17 characteristics, with reported 
mean scores of below 4.0, were found to fall into 
the category of being “beneficial” characteristics 
for a salesperson to possess. When these char­
acteristics are examined based upon the type of 
responding firm, the levels of importance varied 
slightly with non-manufacturing firms reporting 
14 characteristics to be “important” and 
manufacturing firms reporting 11 characteristics 
as being “important” to the success of the 
salesperson. Four of the characteristics, 
Dependability of Salesperson (4.62), Ethical 
Conduct (4.54), Honest (4.53), and Provides 
Regular Service (4.44), were rated higher than 
the remaining characteristics. A sales manager
may well draw the conclusion that these four 
characteristics would be critical characteristics 
for their salespeople to exhibit when dealing 
with either non-manufacturing or manufac­
turing firms.
Each characteristic was then examined through 
the use of t-tests to determine whether 
significant differences existed between non­
manufacturing and manufacturing firms in 
terms of the importance placed on each 
characteristic. Table 2 reveals that six of the 30 
characteristics (Dependability, Knowledge of 
Operations, Sincere, Expert on Offerings, 
Contact with customer, and Opens Discussions) 
were found to differ significantly, at the .05 level, 
while four characteristics (Sells Solutions, 
Flexibility, Risk Taker, and Persistent) were 
found to be significantly different at the . 10 level. 
These findings indicate that a sales manager 
might be well-advised to consider the type of 
clientele with which the sales force will be 
interacting when designing sales training 
programs.
While the mean score ratings for each char­
acteristic are useful in determining the overall 
perceived importance of each characteristic, they 
may not tell the entire story. For example, when 
each characteristic is examined in terms of the 
number of companies contacting the respon­
dents, the perceived importance of several of the 
characteristics change. The mean scores for each 
characteristic as it relates to the number of 
contacts is shown in Table 3.
For those companies having 20 or fewer 
organizations whose sales forces contact them, 
18 of the 30 characteristics examined were rated 
as being “important” characteristics, while those 
companies reporting 21 to 50 contacts found only 
6 of the characteristics to be considered 
“important.” Of those companies reporting over 
51 contacts, 15 of the characteristics were found 
to be “important” for the sales person to possess.
The top four characteristics (Dependability, 
Ethical Conduct, Honest, and Provides Regular 
Service), which were rated high in the overall 
ratings, were also rated high by each of the
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TABLE 2
SALESPERSON CHARACTERISTICS
Characteristic Overall Mean Score Mean Score t-test Significance
Non-Mfg Mfg
Dependability of Salesperson 4.62 4.61 4.65 .019*
Ethical Conduct 4.54 4.52 4.54 .408
Honest 4.53 4.55 4.52 .409
Provides Regular Service 4.44 4.38 4.48 .231
Develops Solutions to Problems 4.09 4.03 4.12 .292
Communication Skills 4.09 4.00 4.13 .216
Sells Solutions 4.08 4.27 4.01 .056**
Listens to Customer Input 4.08 4.24 4.02 .079
Knowledgeable of Operations 4.06 4.27 3.96 .019*
Sincere 4.06 4.30 3.96 .008*
Expert on Product Offerings 4.05 4.33 3.92 .004*
Tailored Presentation 4.05 3.94 4.10 .395
Flexibility in Customizing Services 4.04 4.18 3.97 .076**
Resolves Concerns 3.98 3.94 4.00 .348
Maintains Contact with Customer 3.98 3.79 4.06 .005*
Self-Confident 3.98 4.00 3.95 .366
Positive Outlook 3.88 3.94 3.85 .263
Motivation or Drive 3.87 3.97 3.82 .185
Identify Needs 3.86 3.85 3.86 .471
Prepared 3.81 3.85 3.80 .388
Forecast Problems 3.80 3.94 3.73 .110
Looks for Participation from Customers 3.78 3.70 3.82 .228
Stays Informed of New Developments 3.77 4.03 3.96 .322
Enthusiastic 3.73 3.82 3.68 .190
Assertive 3.72 3.70 3.72 .426
Develops Supply Chain Relations 3.55 3.59 3.52 .357
Opens Discussions with Firm 3.53 3.79 3.42 .016*
Persistent 3.29 3.48 3.20 .068**
Risk Taker 3.16 3.36 3.05 .059**
Social Skills 3.11 3.13 3.09 .435
*Significant at the .05 level **Significant at the .10 level
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TABLE 3
IMPORTANCE OF CHARACTERISTIC BASED UPON NUMBER OF CONTACTS
Characteristic Overall Mean Number of Contacts Sig. Groups
0-20 21-50 51 +
Dependability of Salesperson 4.62 4.73 4.42 4.70 .041 1-2
Ethical Conduct 4.54 4.59 4.26 4.73 .005 1-2, 2-3
Honest 4.53 4.51 4.48 4.63 .524
Provides Regular Service 4.44 4.65 4.26 4.30 .019 1-2
Develops Solutions to Problems 4.09 4.04 3.97 4.30 .188
Communication Skills 4.09 4.15 4.03 4.07 .808
Sells Solutions 4.08 4.12 3.87 4.23 .181
Listens to Customer Input 4.08 4.08 3.90 4.27 .162
Knowledgeable of Operations 4.06 4.08 4.00 4.03 .884
Sincere 4.06 4.16 3.77 4.20 .021 1-2, 2-3
Expert on Product Offerings 4.05 4.18 3.84 4.03 .131
Tailored Presentation 4.05 4.63 3.43 3.73 .166
Flexibility in Customizing Services 4.04 4.16 3.77 4.10 .045 1-2
Resolves Concerns 3.98 4.04 3.87 4.00 .615
Maintains Contact with Customer 3.98 4.10 3.97 3.77 .192
Self-Confident 3.98 4.02 3.81 4.03 .355
Positive Outlook 3.88 4.10 3.61 3.72 .004 1-2
Motivation or Drive 3.87 3.96 3.61 3.93 .130
Identify Needs 3.86 4.00 3.65 3.83 .161
Prepared 3.81 3.98 3.48 3.87 .038 1-2
Forecast Problems 3.80 3.94 3.58 3.77 .148
Looks for Participation from Customers 3.78 3.90 3.74 3.63 .361
Stays Informed of New Developments 3.77 3.92 3.81 4.23 .048 2-3
Enthusiastic 3.73 3.90 3.65 3.50 .055
Assertive 3.72 3.69 3.52 3.97 .019 2-3
Develops Supply Chain Relations 3.55 3.56 3.45 3.60 .825
Opens Discussions with Firm 3.53 3.53 3.55 3.47 .923
Persistent 3.29 3.45 3.13 3.17 .231
Risk Taker 3.16 3.06 3.00 3.41 .193
Social Skills 3.11 3.06 3.19 3.03 .818
Group 1 = 0-20 contacts Group 2 = 21-50 contacts Group 3 = over 50 contacts
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responding contact categories. However, after 
the top four characteristics, numerous differ­
ences in terms of the importance ratings were 
found based upon the number of contacts 
experienced. For example, several characteristic 
ratings from those companies experiencing 51+ 
contacts were found. Specifically, the char­
acteristics of Ethical Conduct, Honest, Develops 
Solutions, Sells Solutions, Listens to Customers, 
and Stays Informed of New Developments, were 
rated higher than in the overall ratings. An 
ANOVA technique was employed to examine 
each characteristic and determine if significant 
differences existed between contact groupings. 
If significant differences were found, the 
Bonferroni post hoc test was employed to 
determine which groups were significantly 
different. The results of this analysis are also 
shown in Table 3. As can be seen from this 
table, eight characteristics were found to differ 
significantly between the contact categories, with 
all differences being between either categories 
one and two or categories two and three.
While no single variable had an overall reported 
mean score of 5 (“must possess”), individual 
respondents did report that they believed that 
certain criteria fell into this area. Therefore, the 
perceived importance of each characteristic was 
examined based upon the specific type of 
industry reporting with the results being shown 
in Table 4.
The data reported in this table reveal that each 
characteristic was reported as being a “must 
possess” characteristic by several respondents. 
These “must possess” scores ranged from a high 
of 76 respondents or 66.7% for Dependability of 
Salesperson to a low of 8 respondents or 7% 
saying that a salesperson “must possess” the 
characteristic of being a risk taker.
It is interesting to note that respondents from 
each of the two types of shippers (non-manufac­
turing and manufacturing) represented in this 
study are very similar in their perception of most 
of the characteristics, they do tend to differ on 
several of the characteristics. For example, 
while 43.8% of the non-manufacturing respon­
dents reported that “Provides Regular Service” 
was a must possess characteristic, 59.5% of the 
manufacturing respondents reported it as being 
a must have characteristic. Conversely, while 
42.4% of non-manufacturing respondents 
reported “Knowledge of Operations” to be a must 
possess characteristic, only 20.5% of manu­
facturing respondents found it to be a must have 
characteristic. Again, it is clear that differences 
between non-manufacturing firms and manufac­
turing firms must be considered when designing 
sales training programs.
CONCLUSIONS
Previous research which has examined the types 
of characteristics or traits which salespeople 
should possess has often been very general in 
nature. The results of these studies have 
revealed salesperson characteristics such as 
possessing communication skills, product 
knowledge, positive attitude, integrity, and sales 
follow up as being desirable. The present study 
broadens the body of knowledge in at least two 
areas. First, salesperson characteristics were 
evaluated in terms of their overall importance to 
the transportation industry. This examination 
revealed four characteristics which stand out as 
being considered to be more important than all of 
the other salesperson characteristics which were 
examined. These characteristics were Depend­
ability of Salesperson (4.62), Ethical Conduct 
(4.54), Honest (4.53), and Provides Regular 
Service (4.44). This information should lead 
sales managers to evaluate their training 
procedures to assure that the company’s sales 
force truly understands the perceived impor­
tance of each of these characteristics. While 
being ethical and honest are harder 
characteristics for a training program to address, 
other characteristics such as the concept of 
providing the customer regular service, along 
with the other characteristics which also were 
rated as being “important” would fit nicely into 
most training programs. It is also important to 
note that these levels of perceived importance 
change slightly when the number of sales force 
contacts are considered. Again, it would seem 
that it is of importance to know and understand
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TABLE 4
REQUIRED SALESPERSON CHARACTERISTICS
Characteristic Must Have
Company Type
Non-Mfg Manufacturing
No. % No. % No. %
Dependability of Salesperson 76 66.7 21 63.6 55 69.6
Ethical Conduct 68 59.6 19 57.6 47 59.5
Honest 63 55.3 18 54.5 44 55.7
Provides Regular Service 61 53.5 14 43.8 47 59.5
Communication Skills 39 34.2 11 33.3 28 35.9
Sells Solutions 36 31.6 12 36.4 24 30.4
Listens to Customer Input 34 29.8 12 36.4 22 27.8
Develops Solutions to Problems 33 28.9 8 24.2 25 32.1
Expert on Product Offerings 33 28.9 16 48.5 16 20.3
Maintains Contact with Customer 31 27.7 6 18.2 25 31.6
Knowledgeable of Operations 30 27.0 14 42.4 16 20.5
Sincere 29 25.4 11 33.3 18 22.8
Resolves Concerns 29 25.4 8 24.2 21 26.6
Customizes Services 26 22.8 10 30.3 16 20.3
Self-Confident 26 22.8 8 24.2 16 20.3
Informed of New Developments 25 21.9 7 21.2 18 22.8
Prepared 23 20.2 7 21.2 16 20.3
Forecast Problems 22 19.3 8 24.2 14 17.7
Motivation or Drive 21 18.4 8 24.2 13 16.5
Tailored Presentation 21 18.4 6 18.8 15 19.0
Identify Needs 20 17.5 6 18.2 14 17.7
Looks for Participation 20 17.5 5 15.2 15 19.0
Positive Outlook 18 15.8 7 21.2 11 14.1
Enthusiastic 13 11.4 6 18.2 7 8.9
Develops Supply Chain Relations from Customers 13 11.4 4 12.5 9 11.4
Opens Discussions with Firm 13 11.4 7 21.2 6 7.6
Social Skills 11 9.6 5 15.6 6 7.6
Assertive 10 8.8 3 9.1 7 8.9
Persistent 8 7.0 5 15.2 3 3.8
Risk Taker 8 7.0 4 12.1 3 3.8
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how many other contacts each firm might be 
experiencing.
The second area of contribution is in the area of 
providing information as to which characteristics 
are thought to be “must possess” characteristics. 
The perception of which characteristics a sales­
person must possess is dependent upon the 
particular type of company the salesperson has 
targeted for his/her sales efforts. By under­
standing which of these characteristics each 
company type values, the sales manager is in a 
better position to either attempt to identify 
salespersons who possess these specific 
characteristics or to attempt to fine tune the 
sales force training programs to consider the 
type of company the sales force will be
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ABSTRACT
Managers/owners of short-line railroads were queried about three issues: (1) How would you 
describe your company’s business relationship with the Class I railroad(s) with which you 
interchange traffic; (2) Do you believe that mergers between Class I railroads have been good 
or bad for short-line railroads; and (3) Besides merger activity, what do you believe will be the 
most important trend for Class I railroads in the next 10 years?
INTRODUCTION
Short-line railroads (defined herein as railroads 
with less than 250 miles of trackage) have been 
part of the transportation industry for many 
decades. Before 1970 their numbers had been in 
a long term decline. For example, in 1916 there 
were approximately 1,000 of these carriers, but 
by 1970 the number had shrunk to about 240 
companies (Levine et al., 1982). The federal 
regulatory environment became more friendly
toward the formation of new short-line railroads 
starting in the early 1970s. This was precipi­
tated by the bankruptcy of the Milwaukee Road 
and the Rock Island railroads. Because portions 
of these railroads could be operated profitably, 
the federal government enacted laws to facilitate 
the operation of the viable segments of the failed 
carriers. Specific legislation included: (a.) The 3- 
R Act of 1973, (b.) The 4-R Act of 1976, and (c.) 
The Local Rail Service Assistance Act of 1978 
(Babcock et al., 1995).
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Further encouragement of the short-line rail 
sector took place in 1980 by the enactment of the 
Staggers Rail Act. This law facilitated the 
formation of new short-lines by procedures that 
liberalized the abandonment of light traffic 
density trackage by the larger Class I railroads. 
(Class I railroads are defined by the Surface 
Transportation Board in terms of their annual 
revenues, adjusted yearly for inflation. 
Currently, Class I railroads have approximately 
$260 million or more in revenues.) Much of the 
abandoned trackage became the new short-line 
railroads (Due 1984). Between 1980 and 1989, 
approximately 230 new short-lines began 
operation (Babcock et al., 1995).
The purpose of this study is to learn more about 
what managers of short-line railroads think 
about Class I railroads. To accomplish this 
objective, we surveyed about 450 owners/ 
managers of short-line railroads. Specifically, 
this article will address the following topics: (a.) 
A brief literature review, (b.) A description of the 
research methodology utilized, (c.) An exami­
nation of the respondents’ answers to this 
question, “Overall, how would you describe your 
company’s business relationship with the Class 
I railroads with which you interchange traffic?” 
(d.) A look at how the short-line owner/managers 
answered this query, “Do you think the recent 
history of mergers between Class I railroads has 
been good or bad for short-line rail companies?” 
and (e.) An analysis of how the respondents 
replied to this question, “Besides merger activity, 
what do you believe will be the most important 
trend for Class I railroads in the next ten years?”
BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW
Short-line railroads are typically established 
when a Class I railroad spins-off their low traffic 
density trackage. For example, when the 
Burlington Northern and the Santa Fe railroads 
merged in 1995, the combined carrier sold about 
2,000 miles of trackage to short-line railroads 
(Fairbank 1999). In 2000 the BNSF indicated 
that additional lighter density trackage will be 
spun-off to short-lines (Blanchard 2001c). Other 
rail industry observers believe that additional
Class I carriers will also continue to rationalize 
their route system (Kruglinski 2001). Class I 
railroads prefer to sell this trackage, because 
short-lines generate additional business that 
would have been lost if the trackage was 
abandoned (Due 1984; Landry and Ozment 
2001a). Finally, short-line railroads are also 
involved in mergers. RailAmerica operates 
approximately 40 short-lines in North American 
and continues to add properties to its corporate 
structure. In late 2001 it purchased StatesRail, 
a privately owned company that operates eight 
short-line railroads (Gallagher 2001a; Rock 
2002).
Operating Characteristics
There are approximately 450 short-line railroads 
in the United States today (Pocket 2000). They 
operate in an analogous manner to commuter 
airlines that feed passengers between smaller 
cities and major city airports. Short-line rail­
roads collect freight from shippers on light 
density trackage and transport it to the Class I 
main-line intercity trackage for delivery to the 
consignee, and vice versa. Rail industry 
management consultant, Roy Blanchard, noted,
The short-line thus is the bridge between 
the batch process of the Class I and the 
custom-made process of the small 
railroad (Blanchard 2001b).
Most, but not all (Turner 2001), short-line 
employees are non-union. While this typically 
results in lower wage rates, a more important 
advantage to management is the less restrictive 
work-rules compared to a unionized labor force. 
Thus, the locomotive engineer may operate the 
train in the morning, do track maintenance work 
in the early afternoon, and make sales calls in 
the late afternoon (Babcock 1995; Due 1984; Due 
and Leever 1997; Probing 1995).
Problems
A recent survey of short-line railroad managers 
by Professors Landry and Ozment found that the 
most serious threat, as perceived by these
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managers, involved their relationships with 
Class I railroads (Landry and Ozment 2001b). 
Here is a summary of the main problems 
involving Class I railroads: (a.) Short-lines 
receive an inadequate percentage of the total 
revenues when interlining with Class I carriers 
(Due and Leever 1997), (b.) After initially 
purchasing the trackage from the selling Class I 
carrier, it is so run-down from years of deferred 
maintenance, that the short-line cannot afford to 
bring it back to acceptable operating standards 
(Carroll 2001), (c.) A “paper barrier” is often 
imposed by the selling Class l carrier that 
mandates that the short-line must interline 
exclusively with them, even if other short-lines 
or Class I’s have trackage that connects to the 
short-line railroad (Wilner 2000c; Wilner 2001a; 
Wilner 2000a), (d.) The Class I’s will not 
adequately supply the short-line with rail cars 
during times of seasonal shortages (Due and 
Leever 1997; Gallagher 1999; Landry and 
Ozment 2001b; Kaufman 2000a), (e.) Class I 
railroads try to convince shippers to locate new 
facilities directly on the Class Fs trackage, so the 
Class I does not have to share the rail revenue 
with the short-line (Burke 1997), (f.) Class I 
carriers desire to exclusively transport rail cars 
that accommodate 286,000 gross weight tons, 
and many short-lines do not have trackage or 
bridges that can safely handle this weight 
(Burke 1997; Gallagher 2000; Saylor 1999; 
Wilner 1999; Zarembski and Turner 2001), and 
(g.) Class I service standards are often so bad 
that shippers become frustrated and switch their 
business to the trucking industry (Duff 2000a; 
Gallagher 2000; Judge 2000; Kaufman 2000b; 
Vantuono 2001a).
Three additional problems that do not involve 
Class I railroads are: (a.) Short-lines are 
devastated when floods or storms wash-out 
bridges, tunnels and trackage, because they 
typically do not have the ability to re-route their 
trains around the problem (Due 1984), (b.)
There may not be enough business located on 
their trackage to generate adequate revenues to 
stay in business, especially if many of the 
shippers are in the same business which then 
experiences an economic downturn in their
industry (Due and Leever 1997; Glischinski 
2000; Prater and Babcock 1998; Wilner 2001b), 
and (c.) Federal Railroad Administration safety 
regulations often place unreasonable burdens on 
small railroads (Landry and Ozment 2001a; 
Landry and Ozment 2001b).
Service Successes
The recent survey of short-line managers by 
Professors Landry and Ozment also asked 
respondents what was their greatest competitive 
advantage over the Class I railroads. By far the 
most common answer was their ability to provide 
shippers with customized service (Landry and 
Ozment 2001b). Service excellence increases 
sales. Burlington Northern Santa Fe CEO Matt 
Rose noted that in recent years, short-line 
railroad revenues have been growing at an 
annual rate of 7%, while Class Fs sales are 
advancing only 2.5% annually (Blanchard 2001c; 
Gallagher 2001c). BNSF Vice-President Peter 
Rickershauser commented that,
Short-lines bring us business that we 
couldn’t otherwise get, with a creativity 
that, quite frankly, is hard to match 
(Vantuono 2001a).
The BNSF obviously appreciates the service 
excellence of short-lines. Dave Garin, a BNSF 
manager, speaking at a rail industry conference 
about short-line railroad strengths, observed, 
“It’s all about service, service, service, and you 
can do it best,” (Blanchard 2001a).
An example of this customer friendly service is 
provided by the Indiana Rail Road. Its employees 
stress improved service reliability. They daily 
transport GE refrigerators with a dedicated 25 
car train that runs from the GE factory at 
Bloomington, Indiana, to CSXT, a Class I 
railroad, at Indianapolis. Tom Hoback, CEO and 
President of Indiana Rail Road, said
I’ve always believed that if you could run 
a railroad like a business and not like a 
railroad, you could do well. We took a 
railroad that was going to be abandoned
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in the 1970s and increased traffic more 
than five-fold (Blanchard 2001c).
Class I Mergers
The railroad industry’s “Golden Era” came to an 
end in 1916. Prior to this, railroads had a near 
monopoly on domestic intercity transportation. 
The only serious competitor was barge trans­
portation on a few waterways and coastal, or 
intercoastal, shipping. Total railroad track 
mileage in 1916 was 254,000 miles, and it 
declined every year thereafter. The primary 
reason was the growth of the trucking industry 
(Stover 1961). Concomitant with the declining 
trackage came a decrease in the number of 
intercity railroads. In 1898 there were 836 Class 
I railroads (Thirteenth 1900), and by 1936 this 
number had decreased to 139 (Locklin 1938). 
What follows are the number of Class I railroads 
for selected years: 1970—71; 1980—42; 
1990—16; 1994—13; and early 2002—7 (Annual; 
Association 2002). Prior to the 1980s, many rail 
mergers were “side-by-side,” meaning that the 
two railroads in many cases served the same 
geographic area. After the merger, the duplicate 
trackage was often sold to short-line railroads. 
More recently the predominant form of rail 
merger has been the “end-to-end” type, 
indicating that each railroad prior to the merger 
served a different geographic area. These types 
of mergers involved less reduction of trackage 
(Burns 1998; Johnson and Whiteside 1975; 
Saunders 2001; Wilner 1997).
With only four major rail systems in the 
U.S.—Burlington Northern Santa Fe, CSX, 
Norfolk Southern, and Union Pacific—some 
shippers believe that rail management has 
become arrogant. Edward M. Emmett, president 
of the National Industrial Transportation 
League, (a large shippers’ organization) noted,
Major rail customers continue to be 
frustrated not only by inconsistent 
service, but also. by a[n] “imperial” 
attitude on the part of some railroads 
(Gottlieb 2001).
This situation, along with the service 
breakdowns that have occurred with recent rail 
mergers (some shippers refer to this as “track 
trauma” (North 2000; O’Reilly 1998)), led the 
Surface Transportation Board to declare a fifteen 
month moratorium on all Class I rail mergers 
that ended in June 2001. This action was taken 
after the Burlington Northern Santa Fe and 
Canadian National applied to the STB for 
permission to merge. These carriers have since 
withdrawn their merger application (Why 2000; 
Shoot-out 2000; Wilner 2000b).
The newly revised STB rail merger guidelines 
became effective in June 2001 (Rail 2001). They 
were designed to not just preserve rail 
competition, but to enhance it. Future rail 
merger applications must contain a “Service 
Assurance Plan,” which details exactly how and 
why the combined carrier will be able to render 
improved service to their shippers. In addition, 
applications that contain “competitive enhance­
ments” will be more favorably considered. These 
include trackage rights, reciprocal switching 
agreements, and improved efforts to work with 
short-line railroads (New 2001).
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To address the aforementioned objectives, a 
survey of owners and managers of short-line rail 
companies was designed. The mailing list was 
compiled from Primedia Directories’ The Pocket 
List of Railroad Officials. For purposes of this 
study, a short-line railroad was operationally 
defined as any railroad identified in the Pocket 
List that operates a system that includes a 
maximum of 250 miles of trackage. This 
definition is consistent with but not identical to 
the Surface Transportation Board (STB) “Class 
III railroad” designation (any railroad with an 
annual operating revenue of less than $20.5 
million) and/or to the Association of American 
Railroads (AAR) “local railroad” designation (any 
railroad with an annual operating revenue below 
$40 million and less than 350 miles of track 
operated).
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The actual mailing list was compiled as follows. 
There are a total of 725 railroad companies 
identified in the Pocket List. Of these, 125 were 
deleted for one or another of the following 
reasons:
• Company was identified as STB Class I or Class 
II railroad
• Company was identified as an AAR regional as 
opposed to local railroad
• Company was headquartered outside the 
United States
• No mailing address was included with the 
directory listing
Of the remaining 600 railroad companies, another 
149 were deleted because of duplicated man­
agement or cross-over ownership so that any 
given individual would be asked to participate no 
more than once. The final mailing list consisted of 
451 unique owners/managers. Each of these per­
sons was mailed a copy of the questionnaire 
approximately one week following receipt of a 
postcard announcing the survey and requesting 
participation. In addition, each was sent a “thank- 
you” letter and follow-up copy of the question­
naire approximately ten days later, for a total of 
three separate mailed contacts. During this 
period, nine questionnaires were returned for bad 
addresses, reflecting a very high overall rate of 
accuracy in the Pocket Directory.
Of the 442 delivered questionnaires, responses 
were eventually received from a total of 114, 
representing a response rate of 26%. This level of 
participation is considered very adequate, espe­
cially given the professional nature and harried 
work lives of the sampled population of railroad 
owners and managers. Of these 114 usable re­
sponses, an additional seventeen were deleted 
because they represented companies that 
exceeded the 250 mile trackage limit set in the 
operational definition of a short-line railroad 
guiding this study. The remaining 97 companies 
comprise the data base of short-line rail com­
panies on which the results reported herein are 
based.
PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS 
AND RESPONDING COMPANIES
As measured by number of employees, the 
responding companies were quite small. The 
sample was divided almost evenly between 
companies with fewer than ten employees 
(49.5%) and those with ten or more employees 
(50.5%). One-fourth of the responding companies 
had fewer than five employees, and three-fourths 
of them had fewer than twenty-five employees. 
Company size was also measure by annual 
revenue, but those results are not presented here 
for two reasons. First, sixteen of the 97 qualified 
respondents (16.5%) chose not to disclose their 
annual revenue. Second, there is a significant 
and fairly strong correlation (+.504, p < .001) 
between revenue and number of employees.
A different dimension of a short-line railroad’s 
size is captured by the total miles of trackage it 
operates, that being an indication of the line’s 
geographical coverage. About two-fifths (39.2%) 
of the short-line companies in the study operate 
with more than 50 miles of track (up to the 
qualifying limit of 250 miles), and three-fifths 
(60.8%) operate with fewer than 50 miles of 
track. Again, forty percent of the companies have 
fewer than 25 miles of track and fifteen percent 
have fewer than ten miles of track.
Just over one-third (36.1%) of the companies 
included in the study were formed before the 
1980 Stagger’s Act that substantially 
deregulated the U.S. rail industry. Another one- 
fourth (26.8%) were formed during the industry’s 
tumultuous decade of the 1980s, and the 
remainder were started between 1990 and 2000.
Respondents were also queried about their own 
age and education. They are very highly 
educated. Nearly forty percent (39.2%) have 
earned a 4-year degree, and another one-fourth 
(24.7%) have received a graduate degree. Thus, 
only about one-third of all respondents (36.0%) 
do not have a college degree (but sixty percent of 
that group have some college education). Finally, 
almost six out of every ten (57.3%) are at least 
Fifty years old.
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RELATIONSHIP WITH CLASS I 
INTERCHANGE RAILROADS
It is absolutely essential to the financial health 
of a short-line that it maintain a good working 
relationship with the Class I railroads to whom 
it bridges traffic. Without their Class I “part­
ners,” short-lines would have no way of 
connecting, literally or figuratively, with most of 
the rest of the world. Correspondingly, short-line 
owners and managers in the study were asked:
Overall, how would you describe your 
company’s business relationship with the 
Class I railroads with which you interchange 
traffic?
____  Very Good   Good
____  Neither Good nor Bad _____ Bad
____  Very Bad
Figure 1 contains the basic results pertaining to 
this question. Only a very few respondents 
characterized their relationship with Class I 
railroads as being negative. Just three of the 
ninety-seven participants said that the 
relationship was bad, and no one said that it was 
very bad. Conversely, half of the respondents 
(50.0%) said that their relationship with 
interchanging Class I rail lines was good, and 
another fifteen percent (14.7%) said that it was 
very good. In total, 64.7% of all respondents said 
that they have a good or very good relationship 
with their Class I “partners.” The remaining one- 
third of respondents (31.6%) characterized the 
relationship as neither good nor bad.
Figure 2 can be used to compare the percent of 
respondents who said they have a good or very 
good relationship with their Class I interchange 
companies across various subgroups of the 
sample based on characteristics of the res­
pondent or his/her company.
The difference involving number of employees 
was statistically significant at the ten percent 
level (chi-square = 3.01; p < .10). Specifically, 
managers of companies with ten or more
employees were significantly more likely to say 
they have a good or very good relationship with 
their Class I interchange lines (73.5%) when 
compared to those from companies with fewer 
than ten employees (56.5%). Also, while not 
statistically significant, there was also a 
tendency for managers of older companies— 
formed prior to 1980—to more often say they 
have a good or very good relationship with their 
interchange railroads (76.5%) and for managers 
with a four year degree to say so (76.3%). 
Collectively, these were the only three subgroups 
in which more than seventy percent of managers 
felt their relationship to the relevant Class I 
roads was good or very good.
CLASS I RAILROAD MERGERS’ 
IMPACT ON SHORT-LINES
Since passage of the Staggers Act in 1980, there 
has been considerable merger activity involving 
the nation’s Class I railroads. How has this 
frenetic situation been received by the 
owner/managers of short-line railroads? To 
investigate this issue, each respondent was 
asked:
Do you think the recent history of mergers 
between Class 1 railroads has been good or 
bad for short-line rail companies?
____  Very Good _____Good
____  Neither Good nor Bad_____Bad
____  Very Bad
Please tell us why you responded as you did:
Figure 3 presents the percentage responses to 
this question. Clearly, more respondents think 
the merger activity has been bad for short-lines 
than think the reverse. In particular, 37.6% of 
respondents think that the merger activity has 
been bad for their sector, and another 18.3%
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FIGURE 1
SHORT LINE’S BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP WITH CLASS I INTERCHANGE RAILROADS
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Percent of Respondents
FIGURE 2
PERCENT INDICATING BUSINESS RELATIONS WITH CLASS I 
INTERCHANGE RAILROADS IS GOOD/VERY GOOD BY CLASSIFICATION DATA
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FIGURE 3
CLASS I RAILROAD MERGERS’ IMPACT ON SHORT LINES
TABLE 1
CLASS I MERGERS: CROSS-TABULATION ANALYSIS
Class I
Railroad
Mergers’
Impact on
Short Lines:
Respondent Age Respondent Education Year Company Formed TotalTrackage
Number of 
Employees
Total
< 50 
Years 
<%)
50 +
Years
(%)
No
degree
(%)
4 Year 
Degree 
<%)
Grad.
Degree
<%)
Before
1980
<%)
1980
to
1989
<%>
1990
to
2000
(%)
< 50 
miles 
<%)
50 + 
miles 
<%)
< 10 
(%)
10 + 
(%)
Good/Very Good 20.5 20.8 28.1 26.3 4.3 27.3 19.2 17.6 17.9 27.0 17.8 25.0 21.5
Neither 20.5 24.5 21.9 23.7 21.7 21.2 19.2 26.5 28.6 13.5 22.2 22.9 22.6
Bad/Very Bad 59.0 54.7 50.0 50.0 73.9 51.5 61.5 55.9 53.6 59.5 60.0 52.1 55.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00
Base (39) (53) (32) (38) (23) (33) (26) (34) (56) (37) (45) (48) (93)
think it has been very bad. Altogether, more 
than half of the respondents (55.9%) think that 
the Class I mergers have affected short-lines 
negatively, as compared to just one in five 
(21.5%) who think this activity has been good or 
very good for short-lines. (Note: The remaining 
22.6% of respondents said the mergers have been 
neither good nor bad for their industry.) Overall, 
the short-line railroad industry has not reacted
well to the recent mergers involving their larger 
cousins.
Table 1 presents a set of descriptive comparisons 
of responses to this question across various 
subgroups of the sample. Generally, the 
contention that the recent merger history 
involving Class I roads has been bad or very bad 
for short line rail companies (representing 55.9%
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of all respondents) was stronger than average 
among respondents who:
• Possess a graduate degree (73.9%) and/or are 
less than fifty years old (59.0%).
• Represent a company formed in the decade 
following deregulation (61.5%).
• Work for a short-line with fewer than ten 
employees (60.0%) or at least fifty miles of 
track (59.5%).
Please keep in mind, however, that the overall 
differences between subgroups in a given classifi­
cation variable were modest; indeed, none was 
statistically significant at the ten percent level or 
less based on appropriate chi-square contingency 
table tests.
IMPACT OF CLASS I MERGERS ON 
SHORT-LINES: DETRIMENTAL 
ASPECTS
Respondents were also asked to explain why 
they felt as they did about the impact of Class I 
mergers. Of the 54 owner/managers who thought 
that Class I merger activity was either “bad” or 
“very bad,” we were able to categorize their 
responses into four general themes. Because 
some respondents mentioned more than one 
reason for their position, there were 84 
rationales enumerated. Each of these general 
themes will be examined in the descending order 
of frequency that they were stated. In addition, 
six reasons (7.1% of the total number of 
explanations) were mentioned only once or twice, 
and they are not included in the discussion.
Less Competition for Short-lines’ Business
The most common explanation why short-line 
owner/managers believe Class I merger activity 
has not been beneficial to them is that it has 
decreased competition for their business. 
Specifically, prior to the merger, the short-line 
was served by two competing Class I railroads, 
both of which desired to obtain more traffic from 
the short-line railroad. After the merger, with
competition often eliminated, there was no 
longer any reason to be concerned about the 
short-line’s business, because as a monopolist, it 
was obtained by default. This explanation was 
stated by 25 respondents, representing 29.8% of 
the total number of reasons enumerated. Below 
are five typical respondent comments. Each of 
these statements is either a direct quotation or 
an amalgamation of the comments of two or 
more respondents.
• Without competition service gets worse, prices 
rise, and nobody cares any more.
• Concentrated power produces less competition 
from the connecting Class I railroads.
• Class I mergers have created giants that are 
extremely difficult to communicate with 
because of their arrogance. Actually you do not 
work with them, they “dictate” rates, and are 
generally unwilling to negotiate any aspect of 
service that you would like to provide to your 
customers.
• We used to have two Class I’s that, at least at 
times, competed for our business. Now they 
have merged and we have been forgotten about 
in terms of meeting our needs, and those of our 
customers. Class I monopoly power is harmful 
to our long-term existence.
• When you have a monopoly, your attitude is 
different than when you have competition. This 
is exactly what is happening to Class I’s today. 
They have a monopoly, and they know we 
know it, and they let us know in no uncertain 
terms that “it’s our way or else—literally take 
it or leave it.”
Class I Merger-Related Service 
Breakdowns
Twenty-three respondents (representing 27.4% 
of the total reasons) stated that as a result of 
recent Class I unifications, and the resulting 
service catastrophes, it has affected their 
business in both the short and long-terms. Here 
are four of their observations:
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• Recent mergers, and the service disruptions 
that then took place, have focused rail 
management on merger integration and cost 
cutting, not on developing new business or 
improving service. In any case, the result is 
that frustrated shippers took their business to 
the trucking industry, and some of this traffic 
will never return to the rail system.
• First the Class 1’s merged. Then service levels 
suffered. The result—we lost business 
immediately and some of it has not come back 
and I don’t think it will.
• As the Class 1’s try to digest their mega­
mergers, service declines. This decline in 
service particularly impacts short-lines, 
because all we have to sell is service.
• Service has never been as bad as it is now and 
nobody at the super-roads seems to pay more 
than lip service to these problems. They just 
don’t get it.
Class I’s Have Minimal Interest in Single 
Car Shipments
Seventeen respondents (20.2% of the total 
reasons) stated that mergers have hurt their 
business because the newly enlarged Class I 
railroads seem to have little interest in single, or 
a few car, shipments. Below are three of their 
observations.
• Today Class I’s do not want to focus on the 
small moves—only on unit-trains, etc. These 
small moves are the “lifeblood” of short-line 
railroads. Their attitude is killing us and they 
don’t seem to care.
• Class I’s apparently do not desire to pick-up a 
small number of cars from short-lines. They 
just want high volume shipments between
major cities. Their marketing people do not 
understand our shippers’ needs and 
furthermore, they don’t want to.
• As the Class I’s become larger, the more their 
personalized service to short-lines gets lost in 
the shuffle. They do not realize, or if they do 
they don’t care, that all we have to sell is 
SERVICE!
Class I Bureaucracy Becomes Invidious
The final problem with Class I mergers, as noted 
by 13 of our respondents (15.5% of the total 
complaints), was that the resulting bureaucracy 
of the enlarged railroad made it more difficult to 
work with the Class I railroad. Below are three 
of their statements:
• The merged railroad becomes even more 
distant from us. We become more and more 
isolated from them, and they have a harder 
and harder time identifying with our situation. 
Their bureaucracies are so mammoth that it 
becomes very difficult for them to make 
decisions in a timely manner. We can make 
decisions almost immediately, but what good 
does it do us, since we have to interline almost 
all of our traffic with them.
• The larger the Class I’s become, the longer it 
takes them to respond to our needs and 
requests. Then when they finally do respond, 
they are less sensitive to our customers needs, 
both in terms of customized rates and services.
• Bigger is not better. It sure is slower when it 
comes to making decisions!
Table 2 summarizes the reasons why respon­
dents believed that Class I rail mergers are 
detrimental to short-line railroads.
36 Journal of Transportation Management
TABLE 2
DETRIMENTAL ASPECTS OF CLASS I 
MERGERS ON SHORT-LINE RAILROADS
Reasons Percentage
Less Competition for Short-Lines’ 
Business
29.8
Class I Merger-Related Service 
Breakdowns
27.4
Class Is Have Minimal Interest in
Single Car Shipments
20.2
Class I Bureaucracy Becomes Invidious 15.5
Miscellaneous 7.1
Total 100.0
IMPACT OF CLASS I MERGERS ON 
SHORT-LINES: POSITIVE BENEFITS
When respondents were asked their opinion 
about the Class I merger movement, 21 short­
line owner/managers thought it was either “very 
good” or “good.” When queried about why they 
took this position, we found that they 
cumulatively noted 28 reasons. Three statements 
were only mentioned once (10.7% of the total 
number of explanations) and are not included in 
the discussion below. Each of the two major 
explanations will be examined below in the 
descending order of frequency that they 
appeared.
Class I’s Will Only Offer Main-Line Service
Nineteen respondents (representing 67.9% of the 
total number of positive explanations) thought 
Class I mergers were beneficial for their industry 
because of the future direction of Class I 
operations. These respondents thought Class I’s 
will continue to heavily stress main-line intercity 
transportation service. Therefore, in many 
situations, the pick-up and delivery service will 
have to be provided by the short-lines. The 
result is the increasing importance of short-lines
to the rail industry. Below are Five of their 
statements.
• Class I’s do not want to be involved directly 
with customers. They desire to exclusively 
dispatch high volume, high speed intercity 
trains. We will become more and more 
important as the customer contact personnel 
with shippers/consignees. With our knowledge 
of each customer’s transportation require­
ments, we will provide the “real people” 
customer service that all shippers/consignees 
desire.
• Larger railroads do not want to be bothered by 
a lot of switching at both ends of a shipment, 
mainly because their labor costs are pro­
hibitively expensive. Nor do they want to be 
involved in shipments to smaller cities. Both of 
these situations are our “bread and butter.” 
This explains why we are in a growth industry.
• As each Class I gets bigger after a merger, they 
become less customer acquainted. These mega­
railroads do not care about the great majority 
of medium and smaller shippers/ receivers. 
This is great for us, because what they want 
out of us is our strength and passion.
• Switching is the bane of large railroads. It is 
our best service. Therefore, I love to see Class 
I mergers!
• Before the latest wave of Class I mergers, 
these large railroads were still trying to do 
their own pick-up and delivery. Therefore, they 
often did not want to try to work with me. Now 
they approach me and ask me to partner with 
them. It is an excellent division of labor. We 
are each doing what we do best.
Accelerating Trend To Sell Branch-Line 
Trackage
Six short-line owner/managers (representing 
21.4% of the total number of reasons enumer­
ated) stated that Class I mergers were beneficial 
to their industry because it would accelerate 
the sale of branch-line trackage to short­
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line carriers. Below are three of their 
observations.
• Class I’s will continue to spin-off low density 
trackage, which they are more and more 
defining as any trackage that is not part of 
their main-line system.
• Class I mergers are expensive. After the 
merger, to generate additional dollars to pay of 
debt, the combined carrier frequently sells off 
low traffic trackage.
• Labor costs are killing Class I railroads. These 
railroads can only operate efficiently and 
profitably on high volume main-line trackage. 
Especially after mergers, when top manage­
ment must now “make their numbers” to show 
the wisdom of the transaction, is when 
additional spin-offs take place.
Table 3 summarizes the reasons why short-line 
owner/managers believe Class mergers are 
beneficial to their industry.
OTHER IMPORTANT CLASS I TRENDS
Each respondent was also asked,
Besides merger activity, what do you believe 
will be the most important trend for Class I 
railroads in the next ten years?
We were able to categorize the responses into six 
general themes, each of which will be examined 
below. When answering this query, the 97 
respondents noted 117 reasons for their 
responses. There were 16 answers (13.7% of the 
total number of reasons enumerated) that were 
only mentioned once or twice, and they are not 
included in the discussion below. Each of the 
explanations will be examined in the descending 
order of frequency that they were mentioned.
Increased Utilization of Scheduled Trains
The most common response about future trends 
for Class I railroads involved the increased
TABLE 3
BENEFICIAL ASPECTS OF CLASS I 
MERGERS ON SHORT-LINE RAILROADS
Reasons Percentage
Class I Railroads Will Only Offer 
Main-Line Service
67.9
Accelerating Trend to Sell Branch- 
Line Trackage
21.4
Miscellaneous 10.7
Total 100.0
utilization of scheduled trains. This idea was 
noted by 36 managers, representing 30.8% of the 
total explanations given. This concept involves 
trains departing classification yards on set 
schedules, regardless of the number of cars that 
have been accumulated when the train is 
scheduled to leave (Vantuono 2001b; Ytuarte 
2001). The effect of this type of train operation is 
far more delivery schedule consistency. Below 
are four respondent statements:
• Service, service, service—this is what will save 
the rail industry. The key to this is scheduled 
train operations, and the CN is showing the 
world how it can be done.
• Our industry will become almost irrelevant if 
service levels do not improve. If they don’t, we 
will just get the bulk commodities that we get 
by default, such as coal, grain, sand, fertilizers, 
ores and bulk chemicals. The key to growth is 
consistent and reliable delivery schedules, and 
the key to this is scheduled train operations. It 
is as simple as that.
• Class I’s must shift their orientation to being a 
service oriented business, from one that is 
operationally oriented. Scheduled train despat­
ching is the obvious answer. At least I hope it 
is the obvious answer, because if the Class I’s 
don’t change, the industry will slowly die, and 
it will take my company down with them.
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• Re-engineering their operations to function 
more like the trucking industry. That is, run 
more trains on set schedules. Shippers will pay 
for a reliable and consistent service.
Continued Class I Sale of Light Traffic 
Density Trackage
Twenty-seven respondents (23.1% of all 
explanations) stated that Class I railroads will 
continue to sell their light traffic density 
trackage to short-lines. The reason is that Class 
I’s will operate with a new paradigm. It will 
involve running trains primarily on their main­
lines between major cities. Branch line trackage 
will be sold to the short-lines, which will then 
feed traffic to the Class Fs. In addition, Class Fs 
will desire to de-emphasize customer contact 
activities, such as pick-up and delivery services, 
which will be operated more efficiently by the 
short-lines. Here are three respondent obser­
vations.
• The new Class I business model will involve 
them operating high speed, frequently 
scheduled trains on their intercity main-lines. 
Short-lines will become their partners to feed 
traffic from shippers on lighter density 
trackage.
• Class I carriers will be in the “wholesale” 
transportation business. They will operate only 
on main-line corridors between major cities. 
The “retail” side of the rail business will be 
conducted by short-lines. We will be the 
customer contact people, who arrange pick-ups 
and delivery, and customize service levels for 
our shippers using the services of the Class I 
railroads.
• Customer relations and marketing in general 
is too labor intense for Class Fs. They just 
desire to run their trains on the high traffic 
density trackage. We will more and more 
assume the marketing activities of the Class 
Fs. Short-lines are starting to be appreciated 
by the Class Fs for the essential services we 
provide.
Rail Industry Renaissance
The 21st Century, according to 13 respondents 
(11.1% of all reasons), will experience a rail 
industry rebirth. The reason is that the highway 
system cannot continue to expand to accom­
modate additional traffic as the economy grows. 
In addition, automobile passengers will continue 
to press for governmental policies that shift 
truck traffic from the highway system to the 
underutilized rail industry. Here are three 
comments.
• Rail/truck intermodal shipments will be the 
norm for the 21st Century. It will happen 
because we as a country cannot afford to even 
maintain the existing highway system, let 
alone build new highway lanes. As this takes 
place, and it has to take place, we as short­
lines will prosper along with the Class Fs.
• Traffic must come off of the highways! They 
are too crowded now and the situation is 
getting worse year by year. Either traffic will 
go all rail, or it will be piggyback, but in any 
case it will be transported between cities by 
rail. This additional traffic will help the rail 
industry, and since the Class Fs look to us to 
be their marketing departments, our impor­
tance can only grow.
• In my judgment, this question is a no-brainer. 
The rail industry will become more important 
by default. Traffic cannot stay on the 
horrendously crowded highway system. The 
only place it can go is to the rail system which 
already has a substantial amount of 
unusedcapacity. I just hope the Class Fs don’t 
drop the ball on this issue.
Labor Cost Reduction
Ten short line-line owner/managers (8.5% of the 
reasons noted) said the most important Class I 
trend for the next decade is their reduction of 
labor costs. Here are two of their statements.
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• The rail industry is plagued by high labor 
costs. This is because the industry is highly 
unionized. Many people do not realize that of 
the three major modes of domestic 
transportation, truck, rail, and air, the rail 
industry has the highest average labor costs 
(not counting management). The only way for 
the rail industry to survive is to reduce labor 
costs. They will do this by outsourcing as many 
activities as possible. Short-lines will perform 
the origination and delivery function, as well 
as most customer service functions. The Class 
I’s will exclusively provide just train service 
between major cities, and all other activities 
will be outsourced to short-lines.
• Class I unionized labor rates must come down. 
Management will ask the craft and operating 
rail unions to allow cross-functional work- 
rules. Knowing rail unions, they will probably 
not agree to this. If this happens, and I’m sure 
it will, then Class I management will continue 
to outsource all but their main-line operations. 
This is why I believe the short-line rail 
industry will become more important in the 
future.
Governmental Funding of Rail 
Infrastructure
Although traditionally the rail industry has 
provided their own right-of-way with no 
governmental funding, this may change. Some 
Class I senior managers have said that this issue 
is too important, and the capital requirements 
are so great, that it needs to be studied with an 
open mind (Gallagher 2001b). Eight respondents 
(6.8% of the total reasons) said that in their 
judgment governmental funding of the rail 
infrastructure will become the norm. Here is one 
comment.
• Class I railroads are not maintaining their 
rights-of-way adequately. Just recently the 
BNSF stated that they are cutting back on 
their right-of-way maintenance, because the 
railroad is not earning its cost of capital. 
Therefore, if we as a country are going to shift 
traffic from the highways to the rails, we must
have a rail system that can accommodate this 
additional traffic. That is why both the federal 
and state governments are going to have to get 
involved in funding the rail infrastructure. And 
Class I management had better swallow their 
pride and accept this financial help, just the 
way the truckers and airlines have for decades.
Federal Rail Re-Regulation
Seven respondents (representing 6.0% of all 
reasons) thought that the rail industry would be 
re-regulated by the federal government because 
of the monopoly situation existing for many 
shippers today (Duff 2000b; Kertes 1998; 
Kruglinski 2001). This situation exists because 
there have been so many mergers that most 
shippers today are served by only one Class I 
carrier. Here is one observation.
• Class I's continue to alienate more shippers 
and community elected officials. This arro­
gance comes from being the “only game in 
town.” It will lead to reinvigorated efforts to 
re-regulate the railroads, because there is not 
enough competition between railroads any­
more. Any time an industry is federally 
regulated, its vitality is diminished. Hence 
short-lines will be hurt, because we are so 
dependent on the Class I’s to provide the long­
distance intercity movement.
Table 4 summarizes the Class I future trends as 
predicted by the survey respondents.
SUMMARY
Short-line owner/managers were asked to 
describe their business relationship with the 
Class I railroads with which they interchange 
traffic. The responses were positive; with almost 
two-third's selecting the “good” or “very good” 
choices. They were next queried regarding their 
thoughts about how Class I railroad mergers 
have affected their industry. Here the owner/ 
managers were less sanguine. More than half of 
the respondents thought these mergers had a 
detrimental impact on short-line railroads. When 
asked why they took this position, the three most
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TABLE 4
MOST IMPORTANT CLASS I TRENDS 
BESIDES MERGERS
Trends Percentage
Increased Utilization of Scheduled 
Trains
30.8
Continued Class I Sale of Light Traffic 
Density Trackage
23.1
Rail Industry Renaissance 11.1
Labor Cost Reduction 8.5
Governmental Funding of Rail 
Infrastructure
6.8
Federal Rail Re-Regulation 6.0
Miscellaneous 13.7
Total 100.0
common rationales were: (1) Less competition for 
short-line business, (2) Class I merger related 
service breakdowns, and (3) Class I’s have 
minimal interest in single car shipments. 
However, about one-fifth of the respondents 
thought that Class I mergers were beneficial to 
them. The two reasons for this position were: (1) 
Class I’s will offer only main-line service, and (2) 
The accelerating trend to sell branch-line 
trackage. The final question involved short-line 
owner/managers perceptions of the most 
important trends among Class I railroads, not 
counting mergers. The three most common 
responses were: (1) Increased utilization of 
scheduled trains, (2) Continued Class I sale of
Annual Reports of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. Years: 1970, 1980, 1990 and 
1994. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office.
Association of American Railroads (2002), E-mail 
received Feb. 5.
light traffic density trackage, and (3) A rail 
industry renaissance.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
The railroad industry is composed of two 
components—the short-lines and the Class I’s. 
This survey, in our judgment, conclusively 
illustrates the symbiotic relationship that exists 
between the two parts. They need each other. 
However, as this survey strongly indicates, only 
one of the two parties clearly understands this. 
Short-line owner/managers know that their 
destiny is tied to the Class I’s. Unfortunately, it 
appears that from the viewpoint of short-line 
owner/managers, their importance to the Class 
I’s is often not appreciated or even compre­
hended. As we gaze into our “crystal ball,” here 
is how we see the future. We believe Class I 
carriers will continue to spin-off low traffic 
density trackage to short-line railroads. The 
Class I’s will also outsource more activities that 
others can do more efficiently than they can. 
This will be especially prevalent with labor 
intensive functions, such as customer service 
activities and the pick-up and delivery of rail 
cars. The Class I’s will specialize in what they 
do best—running scheduled trains on main-line 
trackage between major cities. The short-lines 
will feed cars between the shippers/consignees 
and the Class I’s which provide the intercity 
transportation. As this relationship matures, 
both parties will desire to work together more 
closely for their own mutual benefit. The result 
will be a true “win-win-win” situation. Shippers/ 
consignees will receive better service at less cost, 
while each of the rail partners becomes more 
efficient and profitable. We believe the 21st 
Century will experience a rail renaissance.
Babcock, Michael W., Marvin Prater, John 
Morrill, and Eugene R. Russell (1995), 
“Short-Line Railroads Performance,” 
Transportation Quarterly 49 (2) : 73-86.
Blanchard, Roy H. (2001a), “New Short-Line 
Realities,” Railway Age, 202 (4): 10.
Fall 2002 41
_____(2001b), “Where Will Small Roads Fit?”
Railway Age, 202 (11): 40.
_____(2001c), “Why BNSF Needs Strong Short-
Lines,” Railway Age 202 (12): 10.
Burke, Jack (1997) ‘The Coming War,” Traffic 
World 251 (11)32.
Burns, James B. (1998) Railroad Mergers and 
the Language of Unification, Westport, CT: 
Quorum Books.
Carroll, Jim (2001), “New Railroad to Begin 
Freight Service on New York-Pennsylvania 
Line,” Erie Times-News Feb. 19.
Due, John F. (1984), “New Railroad Companies 
Formed to Take Over Abandoned or Spun-Off 
Lines,” Transportation Journal 2A (1): 30-50.
_____and Suzanne D. Leever (1997), ‘The
Experience With New Small and Regional 
Railroads: 1993-1997,” Transportation 
Journal, 37 (2): 5-23.
Duff, Diane C. (2000a), “A Black-Widow Spider 
Quality at the Railroads,” Journal of 
Commerce, April 10: 8.
_____(2000b), “Competition: Good for Customers
and Railroads,” Railway Age, 201 (4): 49.
Fairbank, Katie (1999), “On the Right Track: 
When it Comes to Service, These Lines Aren’t 
Caught Short,” Chicago Sun Times June 23: 
F12.
Gallagher, John (1999), “Building Short-Line 
Ties,” Traffic World 258 (1): 30.
_____ (2000), “Looking for Answers,” Traffic
World 261 (9): 31.
_____(2001a), “The Big Get Bigger,” Traffic
World, 265 (43): 18-19.
_____(2001b), ‘To Dip or Not to Dip?” Traffic
World, 265 (44): 28-29.
_____(2001c), “Bullish on Rail,” Traffic World,
265 (46): 30-32.
Glischinski, Steve (2000), “I and M Rail Link: A 
Railroad of Contrasts,” Trains 60 (9): 52.
Gottlieb, Dan (2001), “Rail Mergers Stir Outcry 
About Rates, Shipping Services,” Purchasing, 
130 (9): 49.
Johnson, James C. & Terry C. Whiteside (1975), 
“Professor Ripley Revisited: A Current 
Analysis of Railroad Mergers,” ICC 
Practitioners Journal, 42 (4): 419-452.
Judge, Tom (2000), “ASLRRA’s Turner: We All 
Try To Work Together in the Field,” Railway 
Age 201 (9): 32.
Kaufman, Lawrence H. (2000a), “Short-Lines 
Courted by Both Sides in Battle,” Journal of 
Commerce Feb. 7: 1.
_____(2000b), “ ‘Rail Service’ is an Oxymoron,
Customers Say,” Journal of Commerce May 
29: 7.
Kertes, Noella (1998), “'Captive' Firms Said Hurt 
by Rail Mergers,” American Metal Market, 
106 (88): 4.
Kruglinski, Anthony (2001, “Open Access: Not 
If, But When,” Railway Age, 202 (11): 12.
Landry, Michael & John Ozment (2001a), 
“Railroad Renaissance: The Post-1970 Short- 
Line Movement,” Essays in Economics and 
Business 19: 151-162.
_____(2001b), “Short-Line and Regional Railroad
Executives Look At Their Industry,” 
Transportation Quarterly 55 (2): 10-27.
Levine, Harvey A., Clifford C. Eby, Craig F. 
Rockey, and John L. Dale (1982), Small 
Railroads, Chelsea, Ml: Association of 
American Railroads.
42 Journal of Transportation Management
Locklin, D. Philip (1938), Economics of Trans­
portation, 2nd ed., Chicago: Richard D. Irwin.
“New Rules Raise the Bar for Rail Mergers,” 
(2001) Logistics Management & Distribution 
Report, 40 (7): 13.
“North American Railways—Stop Me Before I 
Merge Again,” (2000), The Economist, 356 
July 22: 63.
O’Reilly, Brian (1998), ‘The Wreck of the Union 
Pacific,” Fortune 137 (6): 94-102.
Pocket List of Railroad Officials (2000) 
Hightstown, NJ: Primedia Information, 4th 
Quarter.
Prater, Marvin and Michael W. Babcock (1998), 
“Grain Dependent Short-Line Railroad 
Profitability,” Journal of the Transportation 
Research Forum, 37 (2): 1-16.
“Probing Railroads With AAR’s Harvey A. 
Levine,” (1995), Transportation Quarterly 49 
(2): 41-50.
“Rail Mergers Get the All-Clear,” (2001), 
Business Week, 3738, June 25: 46.
“Rock Island—Size Empire,” (2002), Trains, 62 
(1): 13.
Saunders, Richard (2001), Merging Roads: 
American Railroads, 1900- 1970. DeKalb,IL: 
Northern Illinois University Press.
Saylor, Alice C. (1999), “Rural America Could 
Lose A Key Connection,” Journal of 
Commerce Nov. 9: 6.
“Shoot-Out at the Railroad Corral,” (2000), 
Railway Age, 201 (4): 4.
Stover, John F. (1961), American Railroads 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Thirteenth Annual Report of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission: 1899, (1900),
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office.
Turner, Frank K. (2001), “Dangerous Path,” 
Traffic World 265 (22): 8.
Vantuono, William C. (2001a), “Who Will 
Survive the Short-Line Shakeout,” Railway 
Age 202 (4): 31.
____ (2001b), “How CN Does It,” Railway Age
202 (5): 27-29.
“Why STB Called Time-Out on Mergers,” (2000), 
Railway Age, 201 (5): 44.
Wilner, Frank N. (1997), Railroad Mergers: 
History, Analysis, and Insight, Omaha, NE: 
Simmons-Boardman Books.
____  (1999), “Loans for Short-Lines,” Traffic
World 258 (9): 15.
_____(2000a), “We’re Shippers,” Traffic World
262 (1): 13-14.
_____(2000b), ‘The Ghost of Mergers Past,”
Railway Age, 201 (4): 35.
_____(2000c), “Erie’s Haunting Ghost,” Traffic
World 263 (9): 17.
_____(2001a), “Mad As Hell,” Traffic World 265
(16): 12.
_____ (2001b), ‘The Risk Takers: Ron Crowd,”
Traffic World 265 (27): 25.
Ytuarte, Christopher (2001), “Getting Over the 
Hump,” Railway Age, 202 (10): 29-30.
Zembski, Allan M. and Frank Turner (2001), 
“Challenge and Response,” Railway Age, 202 
(12): 27-29.
Fall 2002 43
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
James C. Johnson is professor of marketing and transportation at St. Cloud State University where 
he joined the faculty in 1976. He previously taught five years at the University of Tulsa. Dr. Johnson 
received a B.S. (Transportation) and M.A. (Economics) from the University of Arizona and a Ph.D. 
(Transportation and Marketing) from the University of Minnesota in 1970. His articles have 
appeared in Journal of Transportation Law, Logistics and Policy, Journal of Marketing, Land 
Economics, Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, Business Horizons, Journal of Business 
Logistics, Transportation Journal, and elsewhere.
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
Diane J. McClure is a senior research associate at St. Cloud State University. Ms. McClure’s 
expertise is in computer software technology and survey design. She has participated in hundreds 
of research projects as an in-house technical consultant. Her articles have appeared in Journal of 
Transportation Law, Logistics and Policy, Business Forum, Transportation Journal, Air Force Journal 
of Logistics, and elsewhere.___________________________________________________________________
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
Kenneth C. Schneider is professor of marketing and marketing research at St. Cloud State 
University. He received a B.A. degree in Economics in 1970 and M.S. degree in quantitative analysis 
in 1972. Dr. Schneider received a Ph.D. in quantitative analysis and marketing from the University 
of Minnesota in 1975. His articles have appeared in Journal of Transportation Law, Logistics and 
Policy, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Consumer Research, California Management Review, 
Business Horizons, Transportation Journal, Journal of Business Logistics, and elsewhere.________
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
Donald F. Wood is professor of transportation at San Francisco State University where he joined the 
faculty in 1970. He received a B.A. (Economics) and M.A. (Economics) from the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison and a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University. Dr. Wood is the co-author 
of Contemporary Logistics and Contemporary Transportation, and he wrote the “logistics” and 
“transportation” entries for the Encyclopedia Britannica.
44 Journal of Transportation Management
LIBERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
AIR TRANSPORTATION MARKETS: 
THE EFFECT OF TERRORISM ON 
MARKET TRENDS
Dawna L. Rhoades
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
ABSTRACT
Since the United States deregulated its airline industry with the Airline Deregulation Act of 
1978, the international air transport industry has been on a path toward market 
liberalization. Market changes have included entry, capacity, and pricing freedom as well as 
increased levels of foreign ownership. The recent terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 have 
the potential to alter, if not reverse this course. This paper examines the forces fueling the 
trend toward liberalization and analyzes the impact of recent events on the future prospects 
of open aviation markets.
INTRODUCTION
According to the World Investment Report 2001 
published by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, global foreign direct 
investment rose to a record US$1.3 trillion 
dollars in 2000. Contributing to this increase 
was the number of cross border mergers and 
acquisitions, which were up nearly 50 percent to 
US$1.1 trillion (UNCTAD, 2001). In addition to 
the growth in FDI, world merchandise and 
service exports have continued to post significant 
gains. World Trade Organization figures 
indicate that merchandise exports rose to 
US$5.47 trillion dollars in 1999 while service 
exports rose to US$1.35 trillion for the same 
period. Travel services accounted for $440
billion of these dollars (World Trade Organiza­
tion, 2001). The latest estimates from the 
International Air Transport Association are that 
the total economic output of the air transport 
industry is over US$1.3 trillion. In the United 
States alone, the airline industry contributed 
nearly $273 billion dollars to the total economy, 
including $109.1 billion in direct expenditures 
(salaries, purchase of equipment, etc), $109.1 
billion in indirect benefits (airports revenue, 
travel agency), and $54.6 billion in visitor 
spending and conference revenues (Air Transport 
Association, 2000).
While the international air transport industry 
has played a significant role in globalization of 
economic activity, the industry itself has
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remained firmly rooted in the domestic market. 
Governments around the world have treated 
airlines like a public utility whose service is said 
to be in the public interest. The public interest 
argument is based on three areas: national 
security and use in national defense under 
programs like the U.S. Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
program, postal air delivery, and contribution to 
commercial activity (Kane, 1999). International 
airlines also “carry the flag” and represent the 
national achievement and pride of their home 
country. This latter role is not to be underesti­
mated. When the bankruptcy and subsequent 
grounding of the Swissair fleet forced the Swiss 
football team to fly Aeroflot to a qualifying match 
in Moscow, one article reported this as a “further 
humiliation for the Swiss flag carrier” (Hall, 
Grant, Done, Cameron, and Dombey, 2001).
Because of the special status accorded to air 
transport, governments have always taken an 
interest in promoting and protecting their 
national carriers. Directly or indirectly govern­
ments played an important role in shaping their 
national aviation systems. A tightly regulated 
international aviation market whose basic 
precepts were laid out even before the end of 
World War II insured protecting the national 
industry and its carrier(s). In recent years that 
regulatory regime has come under increasing 
pressure to liberalize. The terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 have called this trend into 
question as governments worldwide now struggle 
with issues of security. Many of these 
governments are also faced with an aviation 
system on the verge of collapse.
The purpose of this paper is fourfold. First, the 
regulatory development of the air transportation 
system will be reviewed, including the rationales 
for treating air transport as a special case in 
international business. Second, the forces 
leading to liberalization of this market will be 
examined. Third, the progress in air liberali­
zation will be discussed prior to the recent 
terrorist attacks. Finally, the impact of these 
attacks on the transportation industry and 
liberalization will be assessed.
REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT
The development of a regulatory regime for the 
international air transport industry can be 
divided into four phases. Phase I witnessed the 
birth of the industry and a philosophical struggle 
between freedom and tight regulation. Phase II 
began with the reluctant acceptance of a system 
of relatively tight regulation. Phase III saw 
deregulation of the U.S. air transport industry 
and renewed efforts for a more liberal inter­
national air transport regime. Phase IV may 
mark its beginning on September 11, 2001 with 
the attacks on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon.
Phase I, 1910-1943
Seven years after the first heavier-than-air, 
manned flight of the Wright Brothers at Kitty 
Hawk, the first international conference on air 
navigation was convened in Paris in 1910. The 
key debate was over the rights and privileges of 
flying. One view sought to apply the “Freedom of 
the Seas” model to the entire airspace and was 
championed by the French and German 
delegations. The other view argued for the 
sovereignty of nations over the airspace above 
their terrestrial borders with rights to control 
entry and in airspace activities. The British 
were the key proponents of the national 
sovereignty faction. While the Paris Conference 
did succeed in identifying the key concepts, 
terms, and technical provisions of international 
aviation, it failed to resolve the freedom/ 
sovereignty debate. In the absence of interna­
tional agreement, the British moved to pass the 
British Aerial Navigation Act in 1911 (amended 
in 1913). This act declared British rights to its 
sovereign airspace and gave the Home Secretary 
full power to regulate the entry of foreign 
aircraft. The other European governments 
followed the British example prior to the 
beginning of World War I.
World War I clearly demonstrated the potential 
of aviation in the military arena as an offensive 
and defensive weapon. The ability of aircraft to
46 Journal of Transportation Management
support the transportation of troops and 
equipment would not be fully realized until 
World War II, but the supporting role of aviation 
was not ignored following World War I. An 
aeronautical commission formed as part of the 
Peace Conference ending World War I decided to 
prohibit the development of military aviation in 
Germany but to allow civil aviation to continue. 
The Commission also drafted the Paris 
Convention of 1919 whose first article 
proclaimed the right of each state to “complete 
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace 
above its territory.” The Paris Convention would 
remain in effect until superceded by the Chicago 
Convention (Sochor, 1991).
The period between the two world wars saw two 
different models of government intervention in 
the development of the domestic air trans­
portation system. Direct intervention became 
the most frequent method of promoting domestic 
aviation. Governments either provided direct 
subsidies and/or assumed full or partial 
ownership of air transport companies. British 
Airways and Air France are two classic examples 
of this strategy. The British Overseas Airways 
Corporation (BOAC) was created in 1939 when 
two smaller British carriers were merged and 
nationalized. Air France emerged in 1933 from 
the merger and nationalization of Air Orient, Air 
Union, CIDNA and SGTA (Hengi, 2000). This 
direct intervention did not suit the philosophical 
and political tastes of U.S. lawmakers and 
officials. Indirectly, the U.S. government 
strongly influenced domestic air transportation 
through the U.S. Post Office Department that 
was authorized by the Air Mail Act of 1925, also 
called the Kelly Act, to enter into contracts with 
private persons or companies to transport mail 
by air. The Air Mail Act was amended in 1930 to 
give the postmaster the authority to consolidate 
routes in the public interest. Postmaster Walter 
F. Brown used his authority to redraw the air 
map of the U.S. and award air mail contracts to 
a small group of airlines that he considered well 
run and financially stable. In fact, Brown had 
told the carriers that the air mail routes would 
be consolidated and awards granted only to 
carriers with sufficient size to serve the route.
This “forced” major consolidation in the industry 
in an effort to obtain these very lucrative 
contracts, which could provide the stable income 
that passenger service did not offer.
Many routes started offering passenger service 
to provide “additional income” to their air mail 
business (Davies, 1984). A scandal fueled by 
smaller carriers who were excluded from these 
contracts temporarily halted all airmail awards. 
The Air Mail Act of 1934 changed the system of 
awarding contract and barred all prior contract 
holders from bidding on new awards. However, 
the new post-master general, Farley, privately 
advised these airlines to reorganize and reapply. 
Thus, the airlines known as American Airlines, 
Eastern Airlines, and United Airlines were 
formed. In fact, almost all of the major U.S. 
carriers except Southwest, America West, and 
Alaska Airlines can trace their origin to early air 
mail carriers. The increasing importance of air 
mail added a further argument to the “public 
interest” status of air transportation (Wells, 
1994). By 1998, the ten major U.S. airlines were 
responsible for carrying over 251,279 tons of mail 
(Aviation Week, 2000).
Phase II, 1944-1978
While World War I hinted at the importance of 
air transportation to the security of nations, 
World War II with the Battle of Britain and mas­
sive bombing campaigns clearly demonstrated 
it’s potential. The technological advances made 
during and just prior to the war also showed that 
the industry could contribute economically as an 
engine for innovation. Even as U.S. President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill were meeting in 
Quebec to plan the cross-channel invasion, the 
topic of a general meeting to discuss the future of 
air transportation came up as an issue. The 
conference was convened in Chicago on 
November 1, 1944. Representatives of all but 
one of the allied World War II nations attended 
it. The delegates were presented with four 
proposals for an international aviation system. 
The joint proposal of Australia and New Zealand 
called for international ownership and manage­
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ment of all international air service. The United 
States proposal sought a system with 
unrestricted air service rights and market-based 
control of frequency and fare issues. The British 
wanted an international regulatory body to 
distribute air routes and determine frequency 
and fares. The Canadians offered a compromise 
proposal that would have allowed limited 
competition in a system controlled by a 
multilateral oversight body. No agreement could 
be reached on the main issues. Neither the U.S. 
nor Great Britain was willing to compromise 
their positions or jeopardize efforts to conclude 
the war. Great Britain also had one final card to 
play—landing rights. They suggested the 
possibility of developing an all-Commonwealth 
airline with exclusive landing rights in 
Commonwealth and British territories. Since 
the parties had no reason to assume that the 
British Empire would change following the war, 
this appeared to be a credible threat (Sochor, 
1991).
Without agreement on anything but the basic 
freedoms at the conclusion of the Chicago 
Convention, national governments were forced to 
fall back on the traditional means of resolving 
territorial disputes—treaty. In 1946, two key 
wartime allies and aviation leaders, the United 
States and the United Kingdom, met to negotiate 
and sign the first bilateral air service agreement. 
The Bermuda Agreement as it is now known 
became the model for all future bilateral air 
service agreements. The Agreement granted 
each party the five freedoms of the air (Table 1 
lists these five and the four additional freedoms 
added later.) on named routes for multiple 
carriers without specifying capacity or frequency 
limitations. The U.S. also agreed in principle to 
the establishment of an international body, the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), 
to set fares. Subsequent bilaterals not including 
the U.S. also included frequency and capacity 
limitations that attempted to split air traffic 
between designated carriers of the two countries
TABLE 1
THE FREEDOMS OF THE AIR
Freedom Description
First The right to fly over the territory of a contracting state without landing
Second The right to land on the territory of the contracting state for non-commercial purposes
Third The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail for the state of registration to the aircraft to another state
and set them down there
Fourth The right to take on board passengers, cargo, and mail between two other states in another contracting state 
and to transport them to the state of registration of the aircraft
Fifth The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail between two other states as a continuation of, or as a
preliminary to, the operation of the third or fourth freedoms
Sixth The right to take on board passengers, cargo, and mail in one state and to transport them to a third state
after a stopover in the aircraft’s state of registration and vice versa
Seventh The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail between two other states on a service that does not touch 
the aircraft’s country of registration
Eighth The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail within the territory of a state that is not the aircraft’s 
country of registration (full cabotage)
Ninth The right to interrupt a service
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involved. A pooling agreement was often 
included to insure that revenue was evenly 
divided between country carriers (Toh, 1998).
Bermuda I was a compromise that clearly 
favored the U.S., as did most of the other 
agreements signed shortly after the war. Unlike 
the nations of Europe, the U.S. had both a 
number of air carriers and an intact aviation 
system. It also had money that many countries 
sought to help them rebuild following the war. 
As a result, the U.S. carriers were granted 
greater capacity and frequency freedom as well 
as more extensive beyond or fifth freedom rights. 
By 1976, the British felt confident enough to give 
notice of their decision to terminate Bermuda I. 
The Bermuda II agreement, signed in 1977 
eliminated multiple carrier designations, limited 
capacity, and restricted American fifth freedom 
rights. The U.S. viewed this as a major setback 
in the liberalization of international air 
transport (Toh, 1998).
Phase III, 1979-2000
To demonstrate it’s commitment to air transport 
liberalization, the United States initiated three 
actions in 1978. In early 1978, the U.S. issued a 
statement entitled “Policy for the Conduct of 
International Air Transportation.” This state­
ment reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to 
liberalization. Shortly afterwards, the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) issued an order to 
IATA to “show cause” why they should not be 
considered an illegal cartel as prohibited by U.S. 
anti-trust law. Since LATA membership was 
restricted to international airlines whose major 
tasks included setting fares and capacity, there 
was little argument of violation. Finally, in late 
1978, the United States became the first 
government in the world to deregulate its air 
transport industry with the passage of the 
Airline Deregulation Act. This Act would phase 
out the CAB with it’s market control over 
entry/exit, pricing, and service levels and house 
the remaining safety functions of the federal 
government with the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA).
The International Air Transportation Competi­
tion Act (IATCA) of 1979 laid out the competitive 
goals of future U.S. policy as encouraging 1) 
multiple carrier designation without operational 
restrictions, 2) market-based determination of 
air fares, and 3) elimination of unfair and 
discriminatory competitive practices such as 
excessive user fees, exclusive airport services, 
and limited access to facilities. These features 
are incorporated in the U.S. policy of open skies 
(see Toh, 1998 for further discussion). The U.S. 
pursued two paths toward fostering open skies. 
The Director of the Bureau of Pricing and 
Domestic Aviation at the CAB laid out the first 
path. The so-called Encirclement Strategy called 
for the U.S. to bring pressure on smaller market 
countries to sign open skies agreement as a 
means of diverting traffic from larger aviation 
markets. This strategy was based on the 
assumption that open skies would lower fares 
between those countries involved and cause 
passengers to change their traveling patterns in 
pursuit of lower fares. The pressure of falling 
traffic would then encourage larger market 
countries such as the United Kingdom and 
Japan to accept the more liberalized open skies 
agreement (Levine, 1979). The U.S. first sought 
open skies with smaller market countries. These 
countries generated very little third and fourth 
freedom traffic (to and from the U.S.), but stood 
to gain by getting greater access to U.S. 
destinations. There could also be no question of 
exchanging domestic opportunities since these 
small nations had little domestic traffic to 
exchange (Antoniou, 2001). There is evidence to 
support the economic benefits of open skies. In 
the case of the U.S.-Canadian agreement, results 
in the year immediately following the 
implementation of the agreement saw an 
increase in traffic of over one million passengers 
as well as growth in the number of cities served 
(Office of International Aviation, 1996; Pustay, 
1997).
The second path to open skies came through the 
application of the U.S. Department of 
Transportation’s (DOT) policy on approving 
airlines alliances. This policy based approval on
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either the coverage of the rights under existing 
bilateral or proven benefits to the U.S. (Gellman 
Research Associates, 1994). In addition, the U.S. 
DOT has granted immunity from antitrust to 
alliances between carriers from open skies 
countries. Antitrust immunity allows competi­
tors to coordinate on issues of pricing, capacity, 
and scheduling. This has allowed those alliances 
with immunity to achieve greater levels of 
operational integration, thus cutting costs and 
improving quality through coordination (Oum 
and Park, 1997). The “carrot and stick” 
approach toward achieving open skies has 
results in some 50 open skies agreements (Table 
2).
Other countries were also pursuing a more 
liberal approach to aviation. Unlike the U.S. 
domestic deregulation, the Europeans opted for 
a more gradual approach to aviation 
deregulation. The first and second packages 
(1987 and 1990 respectively) liberalized air 
transport among members of the European 
Community by creating additional route and 
carriers designation as well as lifting capacity 
limitations. The third package, which became 
effective in 1993, phased in further liberalization 
ending in April 1997 with the creation of a single 
aviation market in the European Union (Morrell, 
1998). Under this single market, carriers 
established in any of the EU countries are 
granted all of the so-called freedoms of the air. 
With this step, the Europeans have taken the 
lead in air transport liberalization. In fact, the 
position of the European Commission, 
Directorate General for Transport on open skies 
is that “[o]pen skies is an American term which, 
as we see it, is synonymous with a free for all 
system depending on the good behavior of air 
carriers and only a partial opening of the 
market” (Sorenson, 1998, p. 125). The current 
European view is that ownership and domestic 
markets should be opened. These concepts are 
embodied in a proposal put forth by the 
Association of European Airlines (AEA) called 
the Transatlantic Common Aviation Area 
(TCAA). While the AEA suggests that TCAA 
should include liberalization of airline ownership 
and right of establishment as well as harmoni­
zation of competition and leasing policies, the 
basic objective “must be to ensure that all 
airlines of the parties to the TCAA will have 
unrestricted commercial opportunities to conduct 
the business of air transport anywhere within 
the TCAA.” (Association of European Airlines, 
2001). Acceptance of this agreement would 
essentially create a single aviation market across 
the North Atlantic.
Other areas associated with air transport have 
also been undergoing liberalization including the 
privatization of airports, air traffic control 
systems, and airport related services such as 
security and the removal of restrictive policies 
that favored domestic over foreign carriers. The 
privatization of airports began in 1987 when 
Great Britain sold seven of its airports to the 
British Airport Authority (BAA). Since this 
time, airports in Australia, Germany, Italy, 
Argentina and a dozen other countries have 
shifted from public to private hands (Pope, 1996; 
Utt, 1999). Air traffic control systems have been 
or are being privatized in such countries as 
Canada, Switzerland, South Africa, and 
Germany in the belief that private firms would 
not only be able to raise capital more quickly but 
would have a greater incentive to modernize 
ATC systems, decreasing delays and improving 
safety (McCartney, 2001).
In short, the aviation industry in general 
underwent a major reorientation during the 
third phase of its existence. Liberalization 
increasingly won out over efforts to maintain the 
tightly restricted markets of the past. These 
efforts have made air travel more affordable for 
passengers and airfreight more viable for 
international shippers. Liberalization has placed 
a burden on those few remaining government- 
owned and run international airlines. It has also 
threatened the small, nation market airlines 
such as the Belgian airline Sabena. In fact, 
liberalization has been a particular burden on 
small, developing nations that have neither the 
resources to compete effectively with the larger 
international carriers nor the markets to attract 
foreign interest and investment (Abeyratne, 
1998). Nevertheless, as economies grew the level
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TABLE 2
OPEN SKIES AGREEMENTS
Year Date Country Year Date Country
2000 11/28 Benin 1995 6/14 Austria
7/27 Burkino Faso 9/5 Belgium
5/2 Gambia 6/16 Denmark
3/16 Ghana 6/9 Finland
10/12 Malta 6/14 Iceland
10/11 Morocco 6/6 Luxembourg
3/16 Namibia 6/16 Norway
8/26 Nigeria 6/16 Sweden
6/30 Portugal 6/15 Switzerland
10/11 Rwanda
12/15 Senegal
1/8 Slovak Rep.
8/28 Tanzania
5/2 Turkey
1999 12/6 Argentina 1992 10/14 The Netherlands
5/24 Bahrain
10/21 Chile
12/16 Dominican Republic
12/6 Italy
11/10 Jordan
4/12-29 Pakistan
10/21 Qatar
4/13 Umted Arab Emirates
1998 6/9 Korea
7/14 Antilles (Netherlands)
6/10 Peru
7/15 Romania
6/9 South Korea
3/18 Taiwan
2/27 Uzbekistan
1997 9/18 Aruba
6/20 Brunei
5/8 Costa Rica
5/8 El Salvador
5/8 Guatemala
5/8 Honduras
6/21 Malaysia
6/18 New Zealand
5/8 Nicaragua
5/8 Panama
4/8 Singapore
1996 9/10 Czech Republic
5/42 Germany
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of air travel increased. Faster growing regions 
such as Asia saw double-digit growth rates 
during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Phase IV: 2001 and Beyond
Even before September 11th, the U.S. airline 
industry was on a path to lose US $2 billion 
(Arndt, Byrnes, and Woellert, 2001). Part of the 
blame can be attributed to the same two 
historical forces that have plagued the industry 
for decades, a softening economy and over­
capacity. As one famous disgruntled investor, 
Warren Buffet, has noted,
The airline business, from the time of 
Wilber and Orville Wright through 1991, 
made zero money net (Miller and 
Barnhart, 2001).
In fact, the industry suffered its worst previous 
loss between 1990-1993 when it posted losses in 
excess of US$10 billion (Rosen, 1995). The 
airline industry is an old-line, cyclical industry 
with high fixed costs and a very unionized, 
powerful labor force. The industry that 
witnessed significant consolidation following de­
regulation has become increasingly concentrated 
with the top ten major carriers responsible for 
the carriage of the bulk of U.S. scheduled traffic.
While the remainder of the 1990s saw improved 
profitability, there were a number of troubling 
trends including sharp declines in overall service 
quality (rising customer complaints, delays), 
disgruntled high yield business passengers, and 
labor unrest at such airlines as United, 
American, and Comair (Rhoades and 
Waguespack, 2001). Even the US$15 billion 
bailout of the Air Transportation Stabilization 
Act is not likely to prevent a number of U.S. 
carriers from filing for bankruptcy (Arndt et al, 
2001). Meanwhile European carriers are already 
protesting this government aid and requesting 
assistance from their own governments (Flottau, 
2001). Some of the hardest hit EU airlines are 
already requesting assistance (Sparaco and Wall, 
2001).
If there were ever any questions of the economic 
importance of the air transport industry before, 
there are few who doubt it now. U.S. airlines 
have already announced layoffs of approximately 
100,000 employees and some estimates claim 
that there will be an additional six jobs lost in 
the U.S. economy for each airline loss. The 
airline industry appears unlikely to turn a profit 
until at least 2003. Initially, the hardest hit 
area will be the travel and tourism industry, 
which generates over US$578.8 billion a year 
and supports one out of every 17 jobs. Aircraft 
manufacturers such as Boeing will also be hard 
hit and are preparing for layoffs. Other aviation 
system manufacturers such as Rockwell Collins, 
Textron, Honeywell, and Goodrich are likely to 
follow suit raising manufacturing layoffs up to 
100,000 (Arndt and Woellert, 2001; Isidore, 2001; 
Mecham, 2001).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Given the impact of recent events, the trend 
toward further liberalization in international 
transport is likely to stall and may well reverse 
itself as nations struggle to stabilize their 
aviation industries. The U.S. bailout smacks of 
the kind of government subsidy that the U.S. has 
historically derided other governments for 
providing and includes provisions that would see 
the U.S. government taking a non-voting stake 
in airline ownership through either stock 
options, warrants or other equity devices (Bond, 
2001; Toh, 1998). Government authorities, 
particularly in the U.S., may well rethink their 
position on industry consolidation in the face of 
widespread industry bankruptcy. If the 
bankrupt carriers are allowed to continue 
operation as Continental and America West did 
during previous bankruptcies, the industry 
would likely face the same devastating price 
wars that have plagued it in the past as cash- 
strapped carriers drive prices down and keep 
capacity up (Wolf, 1995). The inability of air 
transportation to generate long-term profitability 
has driven stock prices down over 41 percent and 
downgraded some carrier’s credit rating to junk 
bond status (Isidore, 2001). Insurance premiums
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have risen by a factor of 15 for war risk and 
eight-fold for passenger liability (Sparaco, 2001). 
Increased security costs will either be passed 
onto consumers or borne by the U.S. government 
if security is federalized (Arndt and Woellert, 
2001; Ott, 2001).
It is clear that liberalization will be at least 
temporarily stalled as governments struggle 
with the immediate security and economic issues 
raised by the terrorist attacks. The length of 
the stall is partly contingent on the global efforts 
to “root out terrorism.” The long-term fate of 
international aviation is a matter of conjecture, 
but the following three scenarios seem most 
likely.
Scenario One
The trend toward liberalization reverses itself as 
nations revert to a very protectionist approach to 
aviation. The longer the war on terror, the more 
likely international aviation is to slip back into 
the old protectionist pattern. If the events of 
September 11th threaten to devastate national 
airlines and economies, governments are even 
more likely to take actions to protect jobs and 
markets. Even before 9/11, there were forces at 
work that sought to pull back from liberalization. 
Examples of this trend include the European 
debate over the fate of Sabena and Swissair. 
The Belgian and Swiss governments are intent 
on “saving” their national airlines for reasons 
that opponents believe violate the concepts of 
free, open markets. The Canadian decision to 
allow Air Canada to merge with Canadian 
Airlines was also seen as a resurgence of 
aviation nationalism. Most recently, Europeans 
have complained that the U.S. package of loan 
guarantees to post-9/11 carriers exceeded the 
level warranted by shutdown losses and should 
constitute illegal subsidies.
Scenario Two
Consolidation accelerates to the point that 
national governments feel forced to consider 
allowing at least limited foreign involvement in 
domestic markets as a means of generating
competition. This has already occurred in 
Canada where government officials have not only 
indicated that they might consider allowing 
foreign carriers into the domestic market but 
have floated a proposal for a North American 
single aviation area. Under this scenario, a 
TCAA might also come about for several reasons. 
First, the security levels of most EU carriers are 
at least equal if not higher than current U.S. 
levels. Secondly, allowing EU allies in the war 
on terror into the U.S. market would be more 
palatable than throwing the market open to all 
foreign nationals. Finally, it might be seen as a 
reasonable concession to allies who have pushed 
for such an opening. In an effort to aid their 
airlines, the EU members might push even 
harder. They could be aided in their efforts by a 
decision due out in early 2002 from the European 
Court of Justice on whether the EC has the right 
to negotiate aviation agreements with countries 
outside the EU. If the EC were to declare the 
EU a single aviation unit, then the extensive 
“beyond rights” of US carriers would be 
considered cabotage and voided (Bond, 2001).
A number of issues would have to be resolved 
before this scenario could come about including 
changes in ownership rules, right of establish­
ment, and harmonization of a number of the 
laws and policies affecting aviation including 
anti-trust policies, operation of aircraft, leasing, 
etc (European Cockpit Association, 2000). There 
could be a disconnect between the domestic and 
international markets. In an effort to reduce 
costs, many major carriers have announced plans 
to withdraw from less profitable domestic routes, 
many of whom will see regional carrier entry 
(Ott, 2001). In addition, the growth of general 
and business aviation could continue as aviation 
fears, disgruntled business passengers, and 
flexjet leasing programs make it an attractive 
option to commercial travel. Major carriers 
would then focus more on international aviation. 
In effect, there would be a system of smaller, 
regional carriers linking to major, international 
hubs. With a further relaxation of ownership 
rules, it is possible that the Australian/New 
Zealand proposal at the Chicago Convention for 
internationally owned and managed carriers
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would finally become a reality. The current 
mega-alliance (Star, Oneworld, SkyTeam) 
structure might form the nucleus of such 
carriers.
Scenario Three
In a further twist, it is possible that the industry 
would decouple even further into distinct 
businesses such as fleet management, 
transportation, and marketing (Sparaco, 2001). 
This decoupling might allow the industry to get 
around some of the ownership restrictions that 
currently prevent international consolidation. 
Arguments for this type of decoupling draw their 
rationale from two distinct but related fields of 
strategic thinking. The first area is concerned 
with defining a firm’s core or distinctive 
competency. This resource-based view of the 
firm suggests that firms are collections of 
tangible and intangible assets that when 
combined develop competency in certain areas. 
This competency is defined as a skill, knowledge 
or ability that a firm possesses that allows it to 
achieve a competitive advantage over its rivals 
(Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Under this theory, airlines would determine 
what activity they could perform better than 
rivals, then focus on this activity and outsource 
other activities to firms that have an advantage 
in that area.
The second, related area concerns the value 
chain. In essence, a firm is a collection of linked 
activities that may produce value for customers 
(Porter, 1985). In a decoupled system, higher 
profits would accrue to firms performing higher 
value-added activities. Industries can be said to 
have value chains, sequences of activities that 
lead to a final product or service. In 
manufacturing settings such as automobiles, 
aircraft, etc., it appears that the integrator (firm 
responsible for some parts manufacturing, 
supply network management, and final product 
assembly) earns the superior industry returns 
(Galbraith, 1995). For the airline industry or 
more broadly speaking the travel industry, the 
question becomes who in the value chain is best 
able to assume this role. To a limited extent, the
travel agent once performed the role of 
integrator, but this role has been undermined by 
cuts in commission fees, internet access, and 
other direct marketing efforts. Conceivably, a 
firm or group of firms could assume this role, 
adding value to customers by packaging multi­
modal transportation with accommodations, 
vacation packages, etc.
Theoretically, the idea of a “virtual airline” that 
outsources aircraft, cockpit/cabin crew, 
engineering and maintenance, ground handling, 
accounting, and reservations is appealing 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 
1997). This would allow the virtual airline to 
escape two factors that tend to plague the 
industry during economic downturns—over­
capacity and high labor costs. The virtual airline 
would possess the flexibility to reduce both labor 
and fleet quickly. The practical details of the 
virtual airline are more perplexing. On a small 
scale, the concept appears workable, but 
envisioning a virtual airline the size of American 
Airlines is difficult. It is also difficult to envision 
how a traditional airline like American could 
make the shift to virtual. For example, a shift to 
outsourced fleet and crew would likely have to be 
gradual and would incur the opposition of 
existing labor unions who might well be 
prepared to take labor action to prevent the 
shift.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The international aviation industry is clearly at 
a crossroads. While the industry and the govern­
ments who regulate it might be tempted to fall 
back into the familiar highly regulated days of 
the past, it is doubtful that we will see a 
complete reversal if for no other reason than 
customer dissatisfaction. Airline managers, 
government officials, and the industries that 
support aviation need to begin planning for this 
“brave new world.” The key unknown in these 
calculations is the timeframe. Change is not 
something that individuals or firms tend to 
embrace gladly, so it is likely that the industry 
will seek to draw out the transition to something 
like a TCAA on the argument that firms need
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time to make the structural adjustments 
necessary. A similar argument was made for 
NAFTA phase-in. For the near term, scenario 
two seems most likely to succeed in some form. 
The rationale again stems from the fact that this 
change is more of an extension of what went 
before than the decoupling of the industry that 
would represent a dramatic shift in mindset, 
core competency, and basic industry givens.
A number of questions remain unresolved in the 
decoupled scenario that makes it difficult to 
determine its viability or establish any time- 
frame for implementation. First, it is unclear 
how and/or why firms might choose a given 
decoupled segment from a value and profitability 
perspective. As stated earlier, the two areas that 
have generally been cited as preventing the 
industry from achieving long-term profitability 
are overcapacity and labor problems. Individual 
airlines in good times tend to add aircraft to 
their fleet. Then, the inevitable bad times occur 
and the overall industry is faced with 
overcapacity. Individual carriers with new, 
expensive fleets tend to attempt to lower prices 
to fill seats cutting into margins and triggering 
price wars. It is unclear how a decoupled fleet 
management firm would derive long-term 
profits. There are likely to be some “economies” 
to exploit and it is possible to compensate for 
regional downturns by shifting fleets, but a 
global downturn like the post-9/11 environment 
would seem to put such firms at high risk. The 
issue becomes—What type of firm would seek to 
fill this decoupled niche? Some firm must do so 
to make the overall system work. In regard to 
the second factor affecting long-term 
profitability, there are examples of firms 
outsourcing maintenance. There are clearly 
“economies” to be gained by consolidating 
maintenance. It also would be possible to 
outsource flight attendants. However, the key 
labor group has always been pilots. In bad 
times, they have given up wage/working 
conditions to aid firms, but these concessions 
have been the target of immediate concern when 
profits return. Any scenario that threatens this 
group is a likely to stir rapid reaction. When the 
idea of using flight crews from lower wage
alliance partners was floated, unions were quick 
to form inter-alliance union groups to block these 
efforts (Gill, 1998). Even the reservation/yield 
management systems a la Sabre that have often 
been viewed as a key source of advantage in the 
industry have come under criticism for creating 
complex pricing schemes that drive away 
customers, particularly the high margin business 
travelers that support the much larger low fare 
passengers. This is not to say that it is not 
possible to develop a business model for 
decoupled segments that would be capable of 
attracting investment, but it is an elusive 
possibility.
Under Scenario Two, the international carriers 
would restructure their routes and fleets toward 
the international long haul market leaving the 
domestic markets to short-haul, lower cost 
carriers that would feed international hubs 
either because of market forces or marketing 
agreements with the international carriers. This 
would be more of an adjustment of U.S. carriers 
than those in Europe where the flag carriers 
have primarily focused on international routes. 
Competition between individual carriers in a 
TCAA would focus on several key areas: cost and 
fare structure, service quality, and route 
structure/access. In a study of cost competitive­
ness among international carriers, Oum and Yu 
(1997) found that U.S. carriers are more cost 
competitive than all but a small number of Asian 
carriers that benefit from lower labor costs. This 
allows U.S. carriers to offer lower fares and still 
make a profit. On the other hand, U.S. carriers 
are rarely rated highly in surveys of 
international service quality (Zagat, 1992). It is 
less clear how consumers in an open aviation 
market would make the tradeoff between price 
and service quality.
CONCLUSION
Air transportation is a critical link in the global 
system. It has been an enabling factor in a 
process of globalization that has witnessed the 
fall of most tariff barriers, the establishment of 
the World Trade Organization, and the 
integration of many national economies into
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broader trading associations. Yet, air 
transportation itself has only reluctantly been 
dragged along the path to liberalization. The 
events of September 11th can either jumpstart a 
new era of liberal air transportation or stall
recent efforts to achieve liberalization. The 
United States can lead air transport liberaliza­
tion as it has led other efforts to open markets 
and economies but only by taking certain risks 
with its own air transportation system.
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EXAMINING SOURCES OF 
DRIVER TURNOVER FROM A 
MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE
Hokey Min
University of Louisville
ABSTRACT
There is growing concern about the declining profitability of the U. S. trucking industry. Such 
concerns often stem from the increased difficulty of recruiting and retaining qualified drivers. 
In fact, the trucking industry has been hit hard by shortages of qualified truck drivers over 
the last two decades. To cope with this chronic problem, trucking firms have attempted to 
formulate various driver recruitment and retention strategies that include pay raises, 
bonuses, equipment improvement, and adjustments in working hours. This article provides 
trucking firms with the means to implement a more effective driver recruitment and retention 
strategy by examining sources of the driver shortage problem.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the recent downturn of the U.S. 
economy, many trucking firms are still 
experiencing difficulty in recruiting and 
retaining qualified drivers. Over the past two 
decades, the trucking industry has been hit hard 
by a shortage of truck drivers. For instance, 
between 1992 and 1999, employment within the 
trucking industry grew much faster (31.10%) 
than the total employment growth (18.75%) of 
the United States (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
1999). However, despite faster job growth, the 
trucking industry experienced unusually high 
turnover rates. In 1992, for-hire truckload 
carriers often had 100 to 200% annual driver 
turnover rates, whereas the median employee 
turnover in the U.S. was 8.4% (Overdrive 1997).
Driver turnover has already undermined the 
profitability of the trucking industry by causing 
increases in training cost, equipment idle time, 
and service disruptions. Pressured with chronic 
driver turnover and mounting fuel costs, some 
trucking firms such as J. B. Hunt, Schneider 
National, Yellow Freight Systems, Consolidated 
Freightways, Roadway Express, and Swift 
Transportation have raised their freight rates by 
5 to 10% or more (Machalaba 1999). Indeed, 
freight rates are rising as evidenced by a 10% 
increase in intercity trucking costs and an 8% 
increase in local trucking costs (Minahan 1998).
While the industry increases its efforts to control 
trucking costs, there is little sign of improve­
ment. The key to substantial productivity gains 
in the trucking industry is maintaining a steady
Fall 2002 59
workforce. According to the Trucking Economic 
Review (Costello 1999), truckload (TL) carriers 
reported an average of 103% driver turnover rate 
in late 1999, while smaller carriers reported an 
average driver turnover rate of 92%. Such a 
high turnover may be due to an unprecedented 
demand for trucking services, slow growth in the 
qualified labor force, tougher federal safety 
regulations, and poor human resource 
management. Considering the significance of 
trucking to logistics productivity, a high driver 
turnover rate and driver shortage could cripple 
the U.S. economy. In 1998, trucking accounted 
for 86% of the total freight bill in the U.S. and 
the trucking industry grew by more than $24 
billion (Schulz 1998). By 1999, the trucking 
industry employed more than 3.1 million truck 
drivers, an increase of 66% over the 1980 driver 
employment figure (Wilson 2001). By 2006, the 
trucking industry is projected to generate $446.2 
billion in revenues (ATA Logistics Council 1998). 
Therefore, there is a growing need to formulate 
viable driver recruitment and retention strate­
gies to alleviate the ongoing driver shortage 
problem.
Various attempts have been made to address the 
driver shortage problem. Many trucking firms 
such as J. B. Hunt, Boyd Brothers, Contract 
Freighters Inc. (CFI), and O & S Trucking 
boosted driver pay to reduce driver turnover. 
Between 1997 and 1998, 80% of the top 100 
carriers increased driver wages by an average of 
10% (Moore 1999). On the other hand, Celadon 
Trucking and Cargo Transporters began to 
reward drivers for their longevity. U.S. Xpress 
Enterprises, Interstate Worldwide Relocation, 
and Consolidated Freightways introduced bonus 
programs for drivers with safe driving records. 
Reflecting a driver’s desire for new and more 
comfortable equipment, Boyd Brothers reduced 
its equipment replacement cycles from 42-48 
months to 36-40 months (Moore 1997). C. R. 
England & Sons beefed up its driver training 
program by investing $6 million in a state-of-the- 
art driver training center (Kahaner 1998). Other 
driver recruitment and retention strategies 
include a sign-on bonus, profit sharing, flexible
driving schedules, driver recognition, career 
advancement opportunities, and a reduction in 
non-driving activities. Although all of these have 
potential merits, the effectiveness of these 
strategies is not necessarily verified by the 
existing literature. This article moves beyond 
the scope of the existing literature by identifying 
the primary causes of driver turnover and 
suggests viable driver recruitment and retention 
strategies.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To examine the causes of high driver turnover, a 
four-page questionnaire was mailed in November 
of 1999 to approximately 3,000 randomly 
selected trucking firms listed in the National 
Motor Carrier Directory (1999)and located in the 
Midwest (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri) and 
South (Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia). To 
increase variability in the data and generality of 
the survey results, various sectors of the 
trucking industry were represented in the 
sample. These industries include regional 
truckload (TL) carriers (33.5% of the responding 
firms), national TL carriers (21.8%), both 
national less-than-truckload (LTL) and TL 
carriers (11.4%), both regional LTL and TL 
carriers (8.7%), regional LTL carriers (6.1%), 
national LTL carriers (1.9%), and others (16.5%).
Of the 3,000 questionnaires, 422 valid responses 
were received and 16 were returned as 
undeliverable. This produced a response rate of 
14.14%. A response rate below 20% for a mail 
survey is not uncommon in the logistics 
literature (e.g., Mentzer et al. 1992; Murphy and 
Daley 1994; Pedersen and Gray 1998; Sum et al. 
2001). To avoid potential non-response errors, a 
series of tests for non-response bias were 
conducted by comparing early responses with 
late responses in terms of item response. 
Results of the comparison of early and late 
responses indicated that there were no 
statistically significant differences in group 
mean scores for the two waves of samples at a = 
0.05 on any of the item responses. Therefore, 
non-response bias was not a concern.
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The questionnaire contained various questions 
related to the size and sales volume of the 
responding firms, annual driver turnover rate, 
driver profiles, the relative importance of driver 
incentives to driver recruitment and retention, 
and the potential causes of driver shortages. The 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) for Windows (2000) was used to analyze 
the data collected from the sample.
The annual sales volume of the majority of 
responding firms (95.8%) does not exceed $50 
million. Most of the responding firms (76.7%) 
had less than 50 full-time drivers; 97.6 percent 
had less than 500. Ninety-one percent said that 
their part-time drivers comprise less than 10% of 
total drivers. A vast majority of these drivers 
are non-unionized (93.1%), more than 30 years 
old (92%), and have more than five years of 
driving experience (86.7%). However, almost 
two-thirds of the responding firms (65.2%) said 
that their drivers have been with their firms for 
fewer than five years. In other words, many 
firms are lacking tenured drivers. This pattern 
also implies the common occurrence of driver 
“churning” (moving from one firm to another). A 
majority of respondents (61.6%) reported an 
annual voluntary driver turnover rate greater 
than 10% in 1998. Four percent of the 
responding firms experienced severe driver 
turnover exceeding 100%.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The Effects of Organizational 
Characteristics on Driver Turnover
Gooley (1997) indicated that TL carriers, which 
offer long-haul, irregular route services, would 
experience a greater difficulty in recruiting and 
retaining drivers than LTL carriers. The 
rationale was that TL carrier drivers were more 
likely to be on the road longer and have less 
predictable job assignments than drivers of the 
LTL carriers. In fact, driver turnover rates in 
the TL segment have been reported as high as 
300%, far exceeding the industry average of 
about 100% (Bearth 1999). Therefore, it was 
assumed that drivers of TL carriers are less
likely to stay with their jobs than drivers of LTL 
carriers.
H1: A significant correlation exists between 
driver turnover and the type of carrier for 
which a driver works.
In general, organizational size is positively 
correlated with group stability (Caplowl957). 
The rationale is that a large firm tends to have 
greater financial resources and stronger market 
position, providing a greater degree of stability 
than a small firm. Indeed, Chapin (1935) 
discovered that employee turnover decreased 
sharply with increasing firm size. On the other 
hand, LeMay et al. (1993) found in their survey 
of TL irregular route carriers, that larger firms 
had a higher percentage of driver turnover than 
smaller firms, because the latter might pay more 
personal attention to drivers and create a more 
open dialogue than the former. These facts lead 
to the following hypothesis.
H2: A significant positive relationship exists
between driver turnover and the size of 
the trucking firm for which a driver 
works.
The Effects of Driver Profiles on Driver 
Turnover
Beilock and Capelle (1990) discovered that 
drivers of certain age groups (in their 50’s or 
20’s) were more likely to quit driving than those 
in their 30’s and 40’s. Younger drivers tend to 
have smaller opportunity costs for changing their 
jobs or careers due to having a greater number of 
career alternatives than their older counterparts. 
On the other hand, older drivers may leave their 
professions to retire.
H3: A significant negative relationship exists
between driver turnover and driver age.
More experienced drivers are expected to earn 
more than less experienced drivers due to their 
increased skill level. Thus, those with longer 
years of driving experience are less likely to 
leave their current jobs than those with fewer
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years of driving experience. Considering the risk 
aversion nature of human behavior, a driver’s 
years of experience are presumed to influence 
driver turnover.
H4: A significant negative relationship exists
between driver turnover and a driver’s 
experience.
The “Driver Survey” conducted by Gallup (1997) 
demonstrated that the steadiness of the driver’s 
work is the most important indicator of driver 
satisfaction. The greater the driver satisfaction, 
the less likely a driver is to leave his/her current 
position. Keller (2002) also observed that the 
longer a driver was with the firm, the more 
familiar he/she may be with the dispatcher, 
operation, service requirement, and customers. 
Thus, the longer a driver is with a firm, the more 
likely he/she will stay with the firm.
H5: A significant negative relationship exists
between driver turnover and a driver’s 
tenure with the trucking firm.
Beilock and Capelle (1990) found a strong 
relationship between a driver’s income and 
his/her occupational change intention. Similarly, 
Keller (2002) discovered that increased driver 
pay is significantly associated with reduced 
driver turnover. Drivers with lower monetary 
compensation are more likely to leave their jobs 
than those with higher monetary compensation. 
Higher driver salary should provide a significant 
incentive for job stability and reduce driver 
turnover.
H6: A significant negative relationship exists
between driver turnover and a driver’s 
starting salary.
The Effect of the Trucking Firm’s 
Incentives on Driver Turnover
In general, an increase in driver satisfaction 
leads to less driver turnover. Brandt (1997) 
indicated that the steadiness of the work was 
one of the most important predictors of driver job
satisfaction and turnover. Steadiness of the 
work, in turn, often correlates with job security. 
In fact, Ashford et al. (1989) suggested that the 
lack of job security will diminish the employee’s 
sense of attachment and responsibility to the 
organization and increase turnover. Thus, the 
trucking firm which emphasizes the importance 
of job security to its driver retention program is 
likely to experience low driver turnover.
H7: The firm that tends to stress job security
sustains low driver turnover.
Drivers will be more satisfied with their jobs 
when there are greater advancement oppor­
tunities (Wiggins 1990). Similarly, Barnes (1999) 
reported that a diverse career path with 
advancement opportunities would improve driver 
retention. Therefore, the trucking firm that 
provides advancement opportunities should have 
lower driver turnover.
H8: The firm that tends to stress advance­
ment opportunity sustains low driver 
turnover.
Fringe benefits, such as healthcare benefits, are 
tangible inducements that are found to positively 
influence an employee’s decision to stay with 
his/her current job (Buchko 1992; Shaw et al. 
1998). In other words, fringe benefits increase a 
driver’s financial reward and make his/her 
current job more attractive. The projection that 
healthcare costs, such as hospital and doctor 
fees, will go up by 35% to 40% in 2002 could 
make fringe benefits a determining factor in 
retaining a driver (Bearth 2001). Thus, the 
trucking firm that recognizes the importance of 
fringe benefits to driver retention is likely to 
experience low driver turnover.
H9: The firm that tends to stress fringe
benefits sustains low driver turnover.
One thing that drivers wanted more than 
anything else was to be home for important 
family events (Kahaner 1997). Dobie et al. 
(1998) also indicated that the driver’s time spent
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on the road represented one of the most 
important incentives for driver satisfaction. This 
leads to the following hypothesis.
H10: The firm that attempts to minimize the
driver’s time spent on the road sustains 
low driver turnover.
Many firms believe that by improving working 
conditions of drivers, satisfaction and loyalty can 
be increased. According to a driver survey 
conducted by the Upper Great Lakes Transporta­
tion Institute, one of four reasons why the 
surveyed drivers chose a particular trucking firm 
was better fleet equipment (Fleet Equipment 
1999). Since poor equipment can translate into 
less comfort, operational difficulty, frequent 
breakdown, and reduced safety, the condition of 
the equipment influences the level of driver 
satisfaction and subsequent turnover. Indeed, 
some earlier studies (Deierlein 1996; Taylor and 
Cosenza 1998) discovered that driver satisfaction 
is affected by the newness and comfort of the 
truck. Reflecting drivers’ concerns over the 
condition of the equipment, some firms such as 
U.S. Xpress, Trucks for You, and Mary B. Turner 
Trucking have begun to select new trucks based 
upon drivers’ input (Fleet Equipment 1999). 
Such an effort may have contributed to the 
reduced life cycle of trucks and the growing 
popularity of aerodynamic long-nose trucks 
equipped with built-in satellite communication 
systems. Thus, we posit that the trucking firm, 
which recognizes the importance of the condition 
of trucking equipment to driver retention, is 
likely to sustain low driver turnover.
Hn: The firm that provides better equipment
sustains low driver turnover.
HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND RESULTS
To examine whether there is a significant 
relationship between the type of carrier (LTL 
regional carrier; TL regional carrier; LTL 
national carrier; TL national carrier; both 
regional LTL and TL carrier; both national LTL 
and TL carrier) and four different categories of
driver turnover (1-10%; 11-50%; 51-100%; 100% 
or higher), the Chi-square test was used. The 
Pearson chi-square value of 24.938 (p-value = 
.127) does not support Hj at a = .05. Thus, it is 
concluded that driver turnover does not vary 
significantly by type of carrier.
Two separate tests were performed to examine 
the correlation between the size of the trucking 
firm (both in terms of annual sales volume and 
number of drivers) and its driver turnover. Test 
results strongly support H2. A significant 
relationship was found between the size of the 
trucking firm with respect to its sales volume 
and driver turnover at a = .05 (Pearson Chi- 
square value = 33.017, p-value = .001). A 
significant relationship was also found between 
the size of the trucking firm with respect to its 
number of drivers and driver turnover (Pearson 
Chi-square value = 52.629, p-value = .000). In 
particular, a cross-tabulation between the firm 
size and the turnover rate indicates that small 
trucking firms, with less than a $25 million 
annual sales volume, are likely to maintain 
relatively low driver turnover rates (less than 
50%). Similarly, small trucking firms, with less 
than 50 drivers, tend to maintain relatively low 
driver turnover rates of less than 10%.
The result of a Chi-square test does not support 
H3 (Pearson Chi-square value = 19.525, p-value 
= .191), indicating that there is no correlation 
between driver age and turnover. On the other 
hand, the test result (Chi-square value = 38.648, 
p-value = .000) reveals that a driver’s experience 
significantly influences driver turnover. In 
particular, a cross-tabulation between the 
driver’s experience and driver turnover shows 
that drivers who have less than five years of 
driving experience will be more likely to 
experience turnover, while drivers with more 
than ten years of driving experience will be more 
likely to remain with the same trucking firm.
By the same token, the test result (Chi-square 
value = 59.764, p-value = .000) supports H5 at a 
= .05. A significant relationship was found 
between a driver’s length of tenure and driver
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turnover. More specifically, drivers who stayed 
with the same firm more than five years are less 
likely to change jobs.
Surprisingly, the test result (Chi-square value = 
6.884, p-value = .649) does not support H6 at a = 
.05. No correlation appears to exist between a 
driver’s starting salary and driver turnover. 
This test implied that a monetary incentive was 
not an effective inducement for driver recruit­
ment and retention. Although this finding defies 
the common belief that high monetary compen­
sation increases driver satisfaction and thereby 
reduces turnover, it is somewhat consistent with 
the study result of Richard et al. (1995) which 
evidenced that low pay was not necessarily a 
primary cause of driver turnover.
A simple t-test was performed to determine if the 
low turnover firm (less than 50% annual 
turnover rate) stressed the importance of job 
security to driver retention more than the high 
turnover firm (greater than 50% annual turnover 
rate). The test result (p-value = .000) supports 
H7 at a = .05. This suggests that a trucking 
firm’s ability to sustain a low turnover rate can 
be increased by placing emphasis on job security. 
On the other hand, a similar t-test result ip- 
value = .761) rejects H8 at a = .05. The data do 
not support the notion that the low turnover firm 
recognized the importance of advancement 
opportunity to driver retention more than the 
high turnover firm.
Furthermore, H9 (p-value = .092), H10 (p-value = 
.089) and Hn (p-value = .066) were rejected at a 
= .05. There was no significant difference 
between low turnover and high turnover firms 
with respect to perceived importance of fringe 
benefits, amount of time on the road, and 
condition of equipment to driver retention. In 
this sample, advancement opportunity, fringe 
benefits, time spent on the road, and condition of 
the equipment did not prevent drivers from 
leaving their current jobs.
FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
First, the surveyed firms do not regard 
competitive pay scales as a critical attribute for 
driver recruitment and retention. In other 
words, they tend to believe that monetary 
incentives are not necessarily an integral part of 
building a good relationship with their drivers. 
This finding contradicts the report of J. B. Hunt, 
which indicated that substantial pay raises 
reduced turnover rates significantly and 
attracted more experienced drivers (Schulz 
1997). A study by the Gallup Organization (1997) 
reported that the majority (about 80%) of the 
driver shortage problem is the result of driver 
churning (moving from one company to another 
with the same pay). This implies that pay hikes 
alone cannot make drivers happy. Instead, job 
security has been found to influence drivers to 
stay with the same firm. This finding is 
congruent with a recent report indicating that 
today’s drivers are putting more emphasis on job 
security than salary as a result of the slow 
economy and the subsequent increase in layoffs 
(Armour 2002).
Second, a driver’s experience and tenure with 
the same trucking firm have been found to 
influence driver turnover, whereas driver age 
has no bearing on turnover. This finding makes 
sense, in that the more experienced a driver is 
and/or the longer the driver stays with the same 
firm, the greater sacrifice he/she is likely to take. 
In other words, a driver with more experience or 
longer tenure tends to think that the expected 
utility of his/her current job is greater than that 
of the alternatives. In particular, drivers with 
more than ten years of driving experience or who 
have worked for the same firm for more than five 
years have a greater tendency to stay with the 
same firm and profession than their counter­
parts. This implies that recruitment and 
retention strategies should be designed in 
accordance with its driver profiles. Perhaps the 
best strategy to cope with driver shortages is to
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place a greater emphasis on job stability rather 
than providing drivers with short-term monetary 
rewards, fringe benefits, and better equipment.
Finally, defying common sense, the size of the 
trucking firm adversely affected driver turnover. 
Larger trucking firms tended to have higher 
driver turnover rates than their smaller 
counterparts, despite the fact that the former 
may be better positioned to provide drivers with 
greater financial stability than smaller firms. 
The rationale is that smaller firms may pay more 
personalized attention to drivers and be better 
positioned to maintain a solid driver-dispatcher 
relationship than larger firms. Thus, trucking 
firms should treat drivers as “internal cus­
tomers” who need constant personal care.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES TESTING
Hypothesis Result
Organizational Characteristics
H,: A significant correlation exists between driver turnover and the type of carrier 
with which a driver works.
Not Supported
H2: A significant positive relationship exists between driver turnover and the size 
of the trucking firm for which a driver works.
Supported
Driver Profiles
H3: A significant negative relationship exists between driver turnover and driver 
age.
Not Supported
H»: A significant negative relationship exists between driver turnover and a 
driver’s experience.
Supported
H5: A significant negative relationship exists between driver turnover and a 
driver’s tenure with the same trucking firm.
Supported
H6: A significant negative relationship exists between driver turnover and a 
driver’s starting salary.
Not Supported
Incentives
Hv: The firm that tends to stress job security sustains low driver turnover. Supported
H8: The firm that tends to stress advancement opportunity sustains low driver 
turnover.
Not Supported
H9: The firm that tends to stress fringe benefits sustains low driver turnover. Not Supported
Hio: The firm that attempts to minimize the driver’s time spent on the road 
sustains low driver turnover.
Not Supported
Hn: The firm that provides better equipment sustains low driver turnover. Not Supported
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MANUSCRIPT SAMPLE
TEACHING LOGISTICS STUDENTS TO TAKE OWNERSHIP OF INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
DEVELOPMENT
Frank W. Davis, University of Tennessee 
Kenneth J. Preissler, Logistics Insights Corporation
Logistics systems, developed gradually over the past decades, are undergoing necessary radical change in this era of 
increasing global competition. This article describes an approach taken by the authors to teach logistics students 
how to take ownership of designing their own information infrastructure and how to use it to make their 
organizations more flexible, providing more strategic options.
INTRODUCTION
Advances in information systems technology such as data base management systems, bar code scanning, 
telecommunications, and image processing have enabled logistics and information managers with vision to 
reengineer the way the firm conducts its business. The usage of mainframe computers, personal computers, and 
logistics information systems has been widely studied (Gustin 1989). These studies have universally concluded that 
there has been a rapid growth in the usage of computers and logistics information systems.
Computer Usage in the Classroom
The usage of computer applications in a logistics course has also been studied. Rao, Stenger and Wu stated that 
there are several approaches to integrating computers into the classroom in a business curriculum, each with its 
individual advantages and drawbacks (1992).
Table 1 about here
Systems Development in Practice
The study of the information systems development process of computer applications has been almost universally left 
up to the computer science, software engineering, and information systems educators and practitioners.
y = a: - 2ax + x: (1)
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